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Introduction
Never before had any of the Emperor's clothes caused so much
excitement as these. "But the Emperor has nothing on at all! "
said a little child.
-Hans Christian Andersen, The Emperor's New Clothes
There are times when an artist captures some fundamental aspect
of human nature, and when conduct driven by that aspect recurs, then
life imitates art or so it seems. By way of example, this article
explores and seeks to correct a mistake that slipped into trademark
doctrine just over forty years ago and has recently begun to spiral out
of control The mistake occurred in 1958 when then-Assistant
Commissioner Daphne Robert Leeds reinterpreted the Trademark
Act to allow trade dress's registration on the principal register.2 This
erroneous interpretation not only remains a part of trademark law
today, but it entered the law almost without complaint from courts,
treatise writers, and even the Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition, none of whom has expressly acknowledged Congress's
plainly stated intentions on the issue.' To the contrary, many have
lined up to praise the fine weave and precise tailoring of the new
trademark clothes with which Leeds has fitted trade dress. Yet, like
1. See generally Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367,
373-91 (1999) (arguing that trade dress was not intended by Congress to be protected as
trademark under the Trademark Act of 1946). In the recent case, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Samara Bros., Inc., 120 S. Ct. 1339, 1343-44 (2000), the petitioner relied on the Emory
article's brief doctrinal analysis of this issue to argue that Congress did not extend
protection to trade dress under section 43(a). See Brief for Petitioner at *11-18, Walmart
(No. 99-150). Although the Court chose to retain the broad ordinary language definition
of symbol, the Court recognized the legitimacy of the policy concerns expressed in the
Emory article and rejected the possibility of inherently distinctive product design and
features. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, 120 S. Ct. at 1344-45; see also infra text accompanying
notes 239-242.
2. See Exparte Haig & Haig Ltd., 118 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 229 (Comm'r Pat. 1958).
3. Of the commentators, Professor McCarthy provides the most accurate summary of
the recognition of trade dress as subject matter eligible for the principal register, but even
he omits completely the legislative history, the common law background, and Congress's
deliberate decision to exclude trade dress from the register. See 1 J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 7.94 (4th ed.
1999) (recognizing that trade dress was initially denied a place on the principal register).
More typical is Jerome Gilson's treatment, which asserts that "the Act nowhere excludes
trade dress, including product or container configurations" from the principal register and
argues that "the term 'device' would seem to include configurations of goods." JEROME
GILSON & ANNE GILSON LALONDE, 1 TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE
§ 2.14[4], at 2-171 to 2-172 (1999).
the Emperor's new clothes, trade dress's new clothes amount to
nothing at all. Any legitimate and serious reading of the Trademark
Act of 1946 and its accompanying legislative history will reveal that
Congress intended to exclude trade dress from the principal register
and relegate it exclusively to the supplemental register.
This difference between congressional intent and Ms. Leeds'
actions is not some mere technical quibble over which register is more
appropriate. There is a wide gulf between the consequences of
principal and supplemental register registration. Congress intended
trade dress to be eligible only for the supplemental register, which
provides little, if any, procedural or substantive protection for the
mark within the United States.4 Rather, Congress created the
supplemental register to facilitate obtaining protection for a mark
abroad. (Some nations require proof that a foreign mark is registered
in its home state before their law will recognize and protect the
foreign mark.) In contrast, registration of a trademark on the
principal register establishes the prima facie validity and ownership of
the trademark, provides constructive nationwide use and priority, and
after five years, renders the validity and ownership of the trademark
incontestable in certain respects. Leeds' mistake made these
substantial advantages fully available to trade dress claimants.
The law's erroneous development regarding trade dress's place
on the principal register and the resounding lack of complaint that
accompanied it are problematic, not only for their own sake, but
because of the further misinterpretations to which they have led.
Having mistakenly assumed that Congress intended to allow the
registration of trade dress on the principal register, Congress's failure
to include a secondary meaning requirement for or its failure to
include a functionality limitation on trade dress protection becomes a
silence pregnant with intent. If Congress intended to allow trade
dress registration and failed to impose a secondary meaning
requirement, that becomes a basis for inferring that Congress
intended to allow the registration of trade dress without secondary
meaning, at least in some cases.' If Congress intended to allow trade
4. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1094 (West 1997) (stating that "registrations on the
supplemental register shall not be subject to or receive the advantage of sections 1051(b),
1052(e), 1052(f), 1057(b) [prima facie evidence of ownership and validity], 1057(c)
[nationwide constructive use], 1062(a), 1063 to 1068 inclusive [including incontestability],
1072 [nationwide constructive notice], 1115 [incontestability] and 1124 of this title").
5. Compare Wal-Mart Stores, Ina, 120 S. Ct. at 1343-45. (requiring proof of secondary
meaning for product designs to receive protection as trade dress without reference to
congressional silence on the issue), with Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S.
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dress registration and failed to include functionality as a limit on
incontestable registrations, that becomes a basis for inferring that
Congress did not intend to allow functionality to serve as a basis for
challenging incontestably registered trade dress.' Drawing such
inferences, however, would represent further mistakes. Congress was
silent on these issues, not because it intended to change the law, but
because it did not intend to allow trade dress registration on the
principal register in the first place. There was therefore no need for
Congress to address the secondary meaning requirement for or the
functionality limitation on trade dress protection.
The net result of Leeds' mistake has thus been a radical
expansion in the ease with which and the extent to which an
individual may claim the exclusive right to manufacture or market a
particular article. We should fully expect this sharp expansion in
trade dress protection to prove detrimental to consumer welfare.
Broader and more readily available trade dress protection increases
the costs of entering a market for would-be competitors by requiring
such competitors to make a clear differentiation in the form and
packaging of their products in order to avoid a trademark
infringement suit. This drives up the costs of producing competing
products and impairs the ability of the market to produce what
consumers desire at a reasonable price. Furthermore, trade dress
protection increases the rewards from, and therefore the likely
investment in, a product's appearance, packaging, and other
promotional efforts. As increased trade protection makes investing in
product marketing relatively more attractive, it makes investing in
other areas, such as research and development, relatively less
attractive. Thus, increased trade dress protection may have the effect
of promoting cosmetic product differentiation at the expense of true
product innovation.
763, 772-73 (1992) (relying on congressional silence regarding secondary meaning
requirement for trade dress as justification for abandoning secondary meaning
requirement for product packaging).
6. See Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp., 9 F.3d 1091, 1098 (4th Cir. 1993) (mistakenly
reasoning that because Congress did not include functionality as a defense to
incontestability, Congress did not intend functionality to serve as a defense to
incontestability). Until Congress expressly added the functionality requirement in 1998,
one might have gone further and inferred the Congress intended to do away with the
functionality limitation altogether. Courts, fortunately, did not go that far, though the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals did use Congress's failure to define the
functionality doctrine as an excuse for gutting it. See Ex parte Morton-Norwich Prods.,
Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1336 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (suggesting that functionality doctrine was
entirely court-made as basis for court's radical narrowing of doctrine); see also infra text
accompanying notes 111-119.
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Some may suggest that too much time has passed and too many
parties have relied on the seeming acceptance of trade dress as
registrable subject matter to correct this error now. However, given
that this registration practice rests initially on a plainly incorrect
administrative interpretation of the statute, both the courts and the
Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") should retain the discretion to
remove trade dress from the principal register.
Moreover, even if it should now prove too late to correct this
mistake, truth has its own value. At the very least, setting the record
straight should help prevent further misinterpretations from being
built on the false assumption that Congress intended to allow trade
dress on the principal register. More optimistically, it may also
challenge courts to acknowledge their responsibility for recognizing
and radically expanding trade dress protection. Once courts are
forced to confront honestly their role, they will no longer be able to
claim deference to Congress as a justification when they gut the
traditional limitations the common law imposed on trade dress
protection. Even more optimistically, lacking a convenient Congress
on which to lay blame, perhaps courts will take a hard look at the
expansive trade dress protection regime they have fostered and begin
to cut back trade dress protection to a more sensible and rational
level.
Putting these hopes to one side for the moment, this Article will
begin by examining the Trademark Act of 1946 and Congress's
intentions regarding the treatment of trade dress.
I. Congress's Decision to Exclude Trade Dress from the
Principal Register
Section 2 of the Trademark Act of 1946 provides the starting
point for any analysis of the subject matter eligible for registration on
the principal register. It states: "No trade-mark by which the goods
of the applicant may be distinguished from the goods of others shall
be refused registration on the principal register ... ." Three points
regarding this language bear on the eligibility of trade dress for
registration on the principal register. First, the language initially
proposed for section 2 defined registrable subject matter by stating:
"No mark.., shall be refused registration... ."' During the
7. Trademark Act of 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427, 428 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C.A. § 1052 (West 1999)).
8. S. 2679, 68th Cong., § 2 (1925) (emphasis added); see also Hearing on S. 4811
Before the Senate Comm. on Patents, 69th Cong. 28 (1927) (statement of Henry B.
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legislative process, this language was expressly amended to
differentiate "trademarks" eligible for registration on the principal
register from "marks" eligible for registration on the supplemental
register.9 Second, once amended, the language governing eligibility
for the principal register tracked almost exactly the registration
provision in the Trademark Act of 1905," under which it was perfectly
clear that trade dress was not eligible for registration.11 Third, section
2 expressly limits eligible subject matter to those things that qualify as
a "trademark." Under section 45 of the Act,
The term "trade-mark" includes any word, name, symbol, or device
or any combination thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or
merchant to identify his goods and distinguish them from those
manufactured or sold by others.12
When Assistant Commissioner Leeds decided that she would
Brownell, Chairman of the Committee on Trademarks of the New York Patent Bar
Association) [hereinafter 1927 Senate Hearings].
9. See infra text accompanying notes 62-63.
10. Compare Act of Feb. 20, 1905, 58th Cong., ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724, 725 (1905) ("That
no mark by which the goods of the owner of the mark may be distinguished from other
goods of the same class shall be refused registration as a trade-mark on account of the
nature of such mark unless .... "), with Trademark Act of 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427, 428
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1052 (West 1999)) ("No trade-mark by which the
goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused
registration on the principal register on account of its nature unless..."). Some have
pointed to the "on account of its nature" language, others to the "[n]o trademark... shall
be refused" language, to establish that Congress intended to allow trade dress on the
principal register. But the identical language and phrasing appeared in the 1905 Act as
well.
11. See, e.g., In re Barrett Co., 48 App. D.C. 586, 586-87 (D.C. Cir. 1919) (affirming
refusal to register corrugated surface of roofing materials as trademark under 1905 Act);
Herz v. Loewenstein, 40 App. D.C. 277, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1913) (affirming cancellation of
registration for corrugated embossing used to seal individual paper wrappers for
toothpicks on grounds that "[t]he corrugated ends are a part of the manufactured
wrappers"); Societe Anonyme Benedictine v. Puziello, 250 F. 928, 928 (E.D.N.Y. 1918)
("The statute of February 20, 1905, allowing the registration of a trade-mark in use for
more than 10 years, does not alter the fundamental proposition, that a trade-mark is a
design or mark rather than a container or package." The Court stated plaintiff may have a
cause of action for imitation of packaging under theory of unfair competition.);
Philadelphia Novelty Mfg. Co. v. Rouss, 40 F. 585, 587 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1889) ("[I]n
ordinary circumstances, the adoption of packages of peculiar form and color alone,
unaccompanied by any distinguishing symbol, letter, sign, or seal, is not sufficient to
constitute a trade-mark."); Adams v. Heisel, 31 F. 279,280 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1887) ("In this
case the complainants could not obtain a trade-mark for the form of the sticks of chewing
gum they might manufacture, nor by the use of a peculiar form and decoration of the
boxes they may use to hold the sticks of gum, nor in the manner in which the gum might
be placed in the boxes.").
12. Trademark Act of 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427, 443 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C.A. § 1127 (West 1999)).
allow the registration of trade dress on the principal register, she
justified her ruling by interpreting the words "symbol or device" to
encompass an article's packaging.' Justice Breyer recently made a
similar suggestion, offering in dicta a definition of "symbol" as
"anything at all that is capable of carrying meaning."' 4 However, as I
will argue below, "symbol" and "device" were terms of art and part of
the common law's definition of a technical trademark when Congress
incorporated them in the definition of a principal register trademark.
As such, they should be understood in their technical and not their
ordinary sense. A broad interpretation of these terms would
therefore violate fundamental principles of statutory interpretation.
Such an interpretation would also defeat Congress's purpose in
amending the definition of trademark to include the term "symbol,"
ignore the relevant legislative history on the trade dress issue, and
contradict the interpretations given to the Act immediately following
its adoption.
A. The Act's Plain Language Excludes Trade Dress
To demonstrate that Congress did not intend the word "symbol"
in the Trademark Act to mean "anything at all" requires neither
elaborate analysis nor a detailed understanding of the principles of
statutory construction. It appears plainly from substituting the
proposed definition of "symbol" for the word itself in the statutory
language. In defining principal register trademarks, Congress wrote:
[T]he term "trade-mark" includes any word, name, symbol, or
device or any combination thereof [used to distinguish a product's
source].15
Yet, a broad "anything at all" interpretation of the word
"symbol" would read this language as:
A "trademark" includes any word, name, [anything at all], or
device or any combination thereof [used to distinguish a product's
source].
13. Ex parte Haig & Haig Ltd., 118 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 229, 230-31 (Comm'r Pat. 1958)
("The fundamental question, then, is not whether or not containers are registrable on the
Principal Register, but it is whether or not what is presented is a trademark-a symbol or
device-identifying applicant's goods and distinguishing them from those of others....
[Tihe contour or conformation of the container may be a trademark-a symbol or
device-which distinguishes the applicant's goods, and it may be registrable on the
Principal Register.").
14. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995); see also Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 120 S. Ct. 1339, 1341 (2000).
15. Trademark Act of 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427, 443 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C.A. § 1127 (West 1999)).
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Common sense alone suggests that such an interpretation is
implausible, if not nonsensical. Legitimate principles of statutory
construction confirm what common sense suggests: Congress
intended "symbol" to carry a meaning far narrower and more specific
than "anything at all." Four canons of statutory construction control
the proper interpretation of "symbol" and "device" in the Trademark
Act. First, Congress expressly defined "trademarks" eligible for the
principal register using the common law's definition of a technical
trademark. Although the terms "symbol" and "device" had long
been part of that definition, they had specific and well understood
meanings as terms of art in trademark law that did not extend to trade
dress. 6 Where Congress uses a term of art in a statute, there is a
strong presumption that Congress intended the term in its legal, and
not its ordinary, sense. Second, Congress specifically used different
language, "label, package, configuration of goods,"'8 when it intended
to encompass trade dress. Congress intentionally omitted this
language from the definition of a principal register trademark in
order to limit the registration of trade dress to the supplemental
register. Third, a broad interpretation of "symbol" is improper
because it would render other words in the statutory definitions of a
trademark and a mark redundant and would thereby fail to give effect
to each word of the statute.? Fourth, a broad interpretation of
"symbol" is improper because it would read language that Congress
16. See infra text accompanying notes 23-30.
17. See McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 342 (1991); Morissette v.
United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) ("And where Congress borrows terms of art in
which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it
presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed
word in the body of learning from which it was taken...."); Woods v. Lawrence County,
66 U.S. 386,399 (1861) ("[T]erms of art are to be understood in their technical sense when
used in a statute.").
18. Trademark Act of 1946, ch. 540, § 23, 60 Stat. 427, 435 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C.A. § 1091(c) (West 1999)).
19. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993); INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,432 (1987) ("[W]here Congress includes particular language in one
section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed
that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.")
(quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)).
20. See, e.g., Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 140-41 (1994) (noting that courts
must construe statutes to give effect, if possible, to every provision); Moskal v. United
States, 498 U.S. 103, 109-11 (1990) (same); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339
(1979) (same); Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U.S. 112, 115 (1879) ("It is a cardinal rule of
statutory construction that significance and effect shall, if possible, be accorded to every
word.").
expressly revised as if the revision had not occurred.21 Because the
notion that trade dress is eligible for the principal register has become
so fixed a preconception of late,' each of these points deserves
further explication.
First, "symbol" and "device" were terms of art within trademark
law and were part of the common law's definition of a technical
trademark. As such, they should be interpreted in their legal, rather
than ordinary, sense When Congress was considering the adoption
of the Trademark Act, the "technical trademark" doctrine limited the
subject matter eligible for protection as trademarks under the
common law and for registration under the Trademark Act of 1905.
The doctrine prohibited trademark protection for descriptive words
and trade dress, and relegated plaintiffs seeking protection for
descriptive words or trade dress to the doctrine of unfair
competition.24 The language courts and treatises used to define a
21. See, e.g., Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 442-43 ("Few principles of statutory
construction are more compelling than the proposition that Congress does not intend sub
silentio to enact statutory language that it has earlier discarded in favor of other
language.") (quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 446 U.S. 359,
392-93 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting)); see also Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995)
("When Congress acts to amend a statute, we presume it intends its amendment to have
real and substantial effect.").
22. Indeed, by 1995, the notion that trade dress is eligible for registration on the
principal register had become so fixed a preconception that the Qualitex Court cited the
common law's definition of a technical trademark, including the word "symbol," without
even recognizing it. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 170-71 (1995)
(citing the definition of a technical trademark from McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 254
(1877), and characterizing the definition as "rather broadly" defining trademark subject
matter).
23. See, e.g., McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 342 (1991); Morissette v.
United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) ("And where Congress borrows terms of art in
which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it
presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed
word in the body of learning from which it was taken .... "); Woods v. Lawrence County,
66 U.S. 386,399 (1861) ("[T]erms of art are to be understood in their technical sense when
used in a statute.").
24. See, e.g., Coats v. Merrick Thread Co., 149 U.S. 562, 566 (1893) ("There can be no
question of the soundness of the plaintiffs' proposition that, irrespective of the technical
question of trade-mark, the defendants have no right to dress their goods up in such
manner as to deceive an intending purchaser, and induce him to believe he is buying those
of the plaintiffs."); Lucien Lelong, Inc. v. Lenel, Inc., 181 F.2d 3, 4-5 (5th Cir. 1950) ("It is
elementary that a color or container cannot be a trade-mark .... [T]here can be no trade-
mark in a package, the shape of a bottle, or a letter of the alphabet."); Societe Anonyme
Benedictine v. Puziello, 250 F. 928, 928 (E.D.N.Y. 1918) ("The statute of February 20,
1905, allowing the registration of a trade-mark in use for more than 10 years, does not
alter the fundamental proposition, that a trade-mark is a design or mark rather than a
container or package."); Philadelphia Novelty Mfg. Co. v. Rouss, 40 F. 585, 587
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1889) ("[I]n ordinary circumstances, the adoption of packages of peculiar
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technical trademark varied somewhat, but the definition the Court
gave in McLean v. Fleming was typical:
[A] trade-mark may consist of a name, symbol, figure, letter, form,
or device, if adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant in
order to designate the goods he manufactures or sells to distinguish
the same from those manufactured or sold by another...
When Congress enacted the Trademark Act of 1946, it adopted
verbatim the common law's definition of a technical trademark as the
definition of a trademark eligible for registration on the principal
register.27 Such adoption is the veritable smoking gun of legislative
form and color alone, unaccompanied by any distinguishing symbol, letter, sign, or seal, is
not sufficient to constitute a trade-mark."); Adams v. Heisel, 31 F. 279, 280 (C.C.N.D.
Ohio 1887); WILLIAM HENRY BROWNE, TRADEMARKS §§ 89b, 89c, at 137-138 (2d ed.
1885) ("There are decisions which, at the first glance, seem to hold that the mere form of
the vendible article may constitute a technical trade-mark. Careful analyses cannot fail to
induce the conclusion, that the principles of unfair competition, rather than those
appertaining to trade-marks, were the bases of judgment."); JAMES LOvE HOPKINS, THE
LAW OF TRADEMARKS, TRADENAMES AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 53, 54, & 57 (4th
ed. 1924); W.L.P.A. Molengraaff, The Nature of the Trade-Mark, 29 YALE LJ. 303, 304
(1920) ("[P]erhaps the imitation of one of the properties of an article may give rise to an
action for unfair competition or for 'passing off'; but in no case does the quality, the color,
the shape or the size constitute a trade-mark of which the essence is that it be a symbol not
inherent in the article but applied or attached to it.").
25. 96 U.S. 245 (1879).
26. McLean, 96 U.S. at 254; see also Columbia Mill Co. v. Alcorn, 150 U.S. 460, 463
(1893) ("That to acquire the right to the exclusive use of a name, device, or symbol, as a
trade-mark, it must appear that it was adopted for the purpose of identifying the origin or
ownership of the article to which it is attached .... "); Stokes v. Landgraff, 17 Barb. Ch.
608 (N.Y. 1853), 1853 WL 5263, at *1 ("The principle is well-settled, that a manufacturer,
may, by priority of appropriation, of names, letters, marks or symbols of kind, to
distinguish his manufacturers, acquire a property therein as a trade mark."); BROWNE,
supra note 24, § 87, at 137-38 ("The mark may consist in the name of the owner, whether
manufacturer or vendor of the merchandise...; in a seal, a letter, a cipher, a monogram,
or any other sign or symbol that can serve to distinguish the products of one man from
those of another. It may be any symbol or emblem, however unmeaning in itself, as a
cross, a bird, a quadruped, a castle, a star, a comet, a sun; or it may, and frequently does,
consist of a combination of various objects, copied from nature, art, or fancy...." Later
section titles include "§ 89b. The mere Form of a vendible Commodity not a Trade-Mark"
and "§ 137. The Style, or Peculiarity of Package, is not per se a Trade-mark."); FRANCIS
H. UPTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS 9 (1860) ("A trade mark is the
name, symbol, figure, letter, form or device, adopted and used, by a manufacturer, or
merchant, in order to designate the goods he manufactures, or sells, and distinguish them
from those manufactured or sold by another.").
27. See Trademark Act of 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427, 443 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C.A. § 1127 (West 1997)); see also Ex parte Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 74, 75-76 (Chief Exam'r 1952); Ex parte Boye Needle Co., 100 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 124, 124 (Chief Exam'r 1953); Burgess Battery Co. v. Marzall, 92 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
90, 91-92 (D.D.C. 1951); Ex parte American Enka Corp., 81 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 476, 478
(Comm'r Pat. 1949) ("While applicant apparently regards the definition in section 45 of
the Act of 1946 as a new standard for determining what may be a trade mark, it is to be
intent, near-conclusively establishing that Congress intended to adopt
the common law's traditional trademark definition. Whatever
ordinary meaning these words might carry, "symbol" and "device"
had very specific and narrow meanings within trademark law.
Specifically, these words referred to an emblem, artistic figure, or
combination of letters engraved on, burned into, or attached to a
product.' Such "symbols" represented some of the earliest known
trademarks,29  and Anglo-American jurisprudence had long
recognized such "symbols" as eligible for protection as technical
trademarks.' At the same time, the case law had specifically rejected
any interpretation of the terms "symbol" or "device" that would
incorporate product packaging or configuration as technical
trademarks.3 Thus, despite the potentially broad ordinary language
noted that this definition was apparently taken, directly, or indirectly from that contained
in the treatise on the 'Law of Trade-Marks,' by Francis H. Upton, published in
1860 .... ).
28. See, e.g., Herz v. Lowenstein, 40 App. D.C. 277, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1913) ("[T]he size
or shape or mode of construction of a box, barrel, or package in which goods may be put is
not a trademark.") (quoting Hoyt v. Hoyt, 22 A. 755,756 (Pa. 1891)); Adams v. Heisel, 31
F. 279, 280 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1887) (holding that plaintiff may not claim as a trademark
symbol "the mere form of a vendable commodity," "of a peculiar form and decoration of
the boxes" in which the product is sold, or "the manner in which the [product] might be
placed in the boxes"); Moorman v. Hoge, 17 F. Cas. 715, 718 (C.C.D. Cal. 1871)
(recognizing that some parts of the definition of a technical trademark, such as "form" and
"device," "are very broad terms," but ruling that a more limited definition prevails in the
trademark context: "the symbol, figure, letter, form, or device, used for a trade-mark,
must be a mark, impressed, cut, engraved, stamped, cast upon, or in some way wrapped
around, or appended to, the article, or the package, as something independent of the
article itself, or the package used to contain it"); see also Ex parte Minnesota Mining &
Mfg. Co., 92 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 74, 76 (Chief Exam'r 1952) (recognizing potentially broad
ordinary language meaning of term "device" but noting narrower meaning which applies
in trademark law).
29. See, e.g., MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 5.01; Sidney A. Diamond, The Historical
Development of Trademarks, 65 TRADEMARK REP. 265 (1978).
30. See Kann v. Diamond Steel Co., 89 F. 706, 708-13 (8th Cir. 1898) (recognizing the
picture of a diamond as a "symbol" properly protected as a technical trademark); Kinney
v. Allen, 14 F. Cas. 608, 610 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1877) (recognizing as trademarks the picture of
"an Eastern fez, surrounded by rays of light" and "the numerical symbol 1/2, printed in
bold characters, in red color, with the bar between the two figures oblique and nearly
upright"); Morrison v. Case, 17 F. Cas. 837, 837-38 (C.C.D. Conn. 1872) (recognizing as
trademark "the device of a six-pointed star" stamped on shirts or their labels and
packaging).
31. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Robertson, 25 F.2d 833, 833-34 (4th Cir. 1928)
(rejecting claim that diamond pattern in tread of tire could serve as a trademark);
Beadleston & Woerz v. Cookie Brewing Co., 74 F. 229, 231 (7th Cir. 1896) ("[T]he device
employed.., as a trade-mark upon packages containing beer was the firm or corporate
name and the coat of arms of the state of New York surrounded by the words 'Empire
Brewery Bottling Department."'); Holeproof Hosiery Co. v. Wallach Bros., 190 F. 606,
607-8 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911) (using word "device" to refer to a trademark consisting of a
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meaning of the terms "symbol" and "device," these terms carried a
more precise and limited meaning as aspects of the common law's
technical trademark definition.' When Congress incorporates such
terms of art within a statute, courts should presume that Congress was
aware of, and intended the terms to carry, their legal meaning.'
Second, in interpreting "symbol" and "device," we need not rely
solely on a presumption that Congress intended these terms to carry
their legal, rather than ordinary, meaning. Congress specifically used
other terms in the Trademark Act when it intended to encompass
trade dress. Thus, we can contrast the common law's technical
trademark definition-"a word, name, symbol, or device"-that
Congress adopted for principal register trademarks with the
definition Congress adopted for marks eligible for registration on the
supplemental register. For purposes of the supplemental register,
circle containing the words "Holeproof Hosiery" and the monogram "H.H.C." but
distinguishing such trademark device from the question whether the imitation of plaintiffs
packaging constituted unfair competition); California Fig Syrup Co. v. Stearns, 67 F. 1008,
1015 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1895) (reflecting similar separation between "device" and packaging
by stating "[t]he devices on the bottles, wrappers, and packages of complainant were
closely, and for some time exactly, imitated by defendant"); Singer Mfg. Co. v. Riley, 11 F.
706, 708 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1882) (describing as "[t]he well-known device of the plaintiff"
the image of "a shuttle, needles crossed, and the letter S made with the representation of
the thread surrounded by a partial wreath of a plant and the words 'The Singer Mfg.
Co."'); Sawyer v. Horn, 1 F. 24, 31-32 (C.C.D. Md. 1880) (rejecting packaging's shape and
coloring as a trademark); Harrington v. Libbey, 11 F. Cas. 605, 606 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1877)
(rejecting trademark claim to "ornamented tin pail" used as packaging and stating that
where claim is to form of packaging itself "[t]here is no name, no symbol, no assertion of
origin or ownership").
32. Judge Sawyer in Moorman v. Hoge, 17 F. Cas. 715 (C.C.D. Cal. 1871), confronted
this dichotomy between the ordinary and legal meanings of the technical trademark
definition directly in 1871:
The words "form," and "device," [in Upton's definition of a technical trademark]
for instance, are very broad terms, and they might, in a general and
comprehensive sense, embrace the form of a barrel, or package, or of the article
of merchandise itself sold. But the words of definition are all used in connection
with the word, "mark," and the word "mark," in its first and usual signification is
defined, by Webster, to be "a visible sign, made or left upon any thing .... " And
some such mark used in connection with, impressed, cut, or stamped upon, or
attached to the article manufactured, or sold, in the ordinary course of trade,
embraces the usual and ordinary idea of a "trade-mark."
17 F. Cas. at 718.
33. See McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 342 (1991); Morissette v.
United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) ("And where Congress borrows terms of art in
which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it
presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed
word in the body of learning from which it was taken. .. ."); Woods v. Lawrence County,
66 U.S. 386,399 (1861) ("[T]erms of art are to be understood in their technical sense when
used in a statute.").
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Congress defined a "mark" as "any trade-mark, symbol, label,
package, configuration of goods, name, word, slogan, phrase,
surname, geographical name, numeral, or device or any combination
of the foregoing." 4 On its own, Congress's use of different language
in defining principal register trademarks and supplemental register
marks is persuasive evidence that Congress did not intend the two
definitions to carry the same meaning. 5 In addition, Congress's use of
specific trade dress language, "label, package, [and] configuration of
goods," in the supplemental register definition establishes that
Congress knew how to encompass trade dress when it so intended.
The fact that Congress then included the trade dress language in the
definition of a supplemental register mark, but excluded the trade
dress language from the definition of a principal register trademark
reflects Congress's deliberate decision to limit the registration of
trade dress to the supplemental register.36 Similarly, in section 2(f) of
the Trademark Act, Congress expressly allowed the registration of
descriptive word marks on the principal register upon a showing of
secondary meaning.' In doing so, Congress again demonstrated its
understanding of the technical trademark doctrine and the need to
incorporate specific language where it intended to modify the
doctrine. Again, that Congress included language that changed the
common law's exclusion of descriptive words from principal register
trademarks, but refused to include language that would have changed
the common law's exclusion of trade dress, confirms that Congress
intended to exclude trade dress from the principal register.
Third, the structure and precise wording of the statutory
34. Trademark Act of 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427, 435-36 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C.A. § 1091(c) (West 1997)).
35. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) ("We refrain from concluding
here that the differing language in the two subsections has the same meaning in each. We
would not presume to ascribe this difference to a simple mistake in draftsmanship.").
36. See Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 176-77 (1994) (refusing to
recognize aiding and abetting liability under the Securities Act because "Congress knew
how to impose aiding and abetting liability when it chose to do so" and "did not" in
section 10(b)); Ex parte Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 74, 75-76
(Chief Exam'r 1952) (noting that Congress adopted separate definitions for "marks"
registrable on the supplemental register, and "trade-marks" registrable on the principal
register); see also Ex parte Boye Needle Co., 100 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124 (Chief Exam'r
1953); Burgess Battery Co. v. Marzall, 92 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 90, 91 (D.D.C. 1951); Walter J.
Derenberg, The Lanham Act of 1946: Practical Effects and Experiences after One Year's
Administration, 38 TRADEMARK REP. 831, 835 (1948) (noting that items that might
qualify as trade dress "were deliberately left outside the definition of a 'trade-mark' in
section 45" and are not therefore eligible for registration on the principal register).
37. Trademark Act of 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427, 429 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C.A. § 1052(f) (West 1997)).
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definitions of mark and trademark further confirm that Congress
intended "symbol" to carry its narrower, technical meaning. Rather
than appear alone in the statutory definitions, the word "symbol"
appears in the midst of additional terms. Thus, in the principal
register definition, the word "symbol" is the third of four terms,
appearing after "word, name" and just before "or device."' These
other terms refer to specific categories of eligible subject matter, and
by placing "symbol" amongst such specific terms, presumably
Congress intended "symbol" to carry a similarly specific meaning.
Moreover, in neither ordinary speech nor statutory language does a
general catch-all category typically appear as the third of four items in
a list and Congress had already included a general catch-all category
through the words "or any combination thereof" at the end of the
trademark definition?9 Finally, if "symbol" is read as "anything at
all," the term "symbol" would already encompass a "word, name,...
or device," and would already encompass a "label, package,
configuration of goods, name, word, slogan, phrase, surname,
geographical name, numeral or device."'  As a result, a broad
interpretation of "symbol" would render large parts of these statutory
definitions redundant and would violate the fundamental rule
requiring the Court "to give effect, if possible, to every clause and
word of a statute."'" Giving "symbol" its narrower, technical
definition, on the other hand, avoids such redundancy and therefore
properly reflects Congress's intent.
Fourth, Congress amended the definition of "trademark" to
include the "word, name, symbol, or device" limitation fairly late in
the legislative process leading to the Trademark Act of 1946. From
its first introduction in 1924 until 1943, the proposed act defined
"trademark" in a broad fashion. For example, S. 2679, introduced in
38. Trademark Act of 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427, 443 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C.A. § 1091(c)(West Supp. 1999)). Similarly, in the definition of supplemental marks,
"symbol" is the second of thirteen terms, and appears alongside such specific categories as,
"label, package, configuration of goods, name, word, slogan, phrase, surname,
geographical name, numeral, [or] device." Trademark Act of 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427,
435-36 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1091(c) (West Supp. 1999)).
39. In the definition of supplemental marks, Congress also ended the list with a
general catch-all provision, "or any combination of any of the foregoing." Trademark Act
of 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427, 436 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1091(c) (West
Supp. 1999)).
40. Ld.
41. Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1882); see also Washington Market Co.
v. Hoffman, 101 U.S. 112, 115 (1879); Platt v. Union Pac. R.R., 99 U.S. 48,58 (1878); In re
Nantucket, Inc., 677 F.2d 95, 98 (C.C.P.A. 1982); Tabor v. Ulloa 323 F.2d 823, 824 (9th Cir.
1963).
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1924, defined trademarks registrable on the principal register as
follows: "The term trade-mark includes any mark so used as to
distinguish the source or origin of the user's goods... ."' H.R. 9041,
introduced in 1938, provided: "The term 'trade-mark' includes any
mark so used as to distinguish the user's goods from the goods of
others .... ""4 Similarly, H.R. 102 and H.R. 4744, introduced in 1941
and 1939, respectively, provided that "[t]he terms 'trade-mark' and
'mark' include any mark which is entitled to registration under the
terms of this Act... whether registered or not."" All of these bills
expressly defined "trademarks" as "any mark" and may thereby have
incorporated by reference the broad definition of "marks" eligible for
registration on the supplemental register.45 The 1924 and 1938 bills
also focused eligibility for registration exclusively on whether the
thing claimed as a trademark was being "so used as to distinguish" the
applicant's goods, implicitly suggesting that distinguishing use was the
sole test for registrability. 6
In 1943, just three years before final enactment, Congress
amended the definition of "trademark" in the proposed bill and
replaced it with the language eventually adopted, defining a
trademark as a "word, name, symbol, or device."'47 By doing so,
42. S. 2679, 68th Cong. § 31 (1925).
43. H.R. 9041, 75th Cong. § 43 (1938), reprinted in Trade-marks: Hearings on H.R.
9041 Before the Subcomm. on Trade-marks of the House Comm. on Patents, 75th Cong. 9
(1938) [hereinafter 1938 Trademark Hearings].
44. H.R. 102,77th Cong. § 45 (1941), reprinted in Trade-marks: Hearings on H.R. 102,
H.R. 5461, and S. 895 Before the Subcomm. on Trade-marks of the House Comm. on
Patents, 77th Cong. 13 (1941); H.R. 4744,76th Cong. § 46 (1939), reprinted in Trade-marks:
Hearings on H.R. 4744 Before the Subcomm. on Trade-marks of the House Comm. on
Patents, 76th Cong. 9 (1939) [herinafter 1939 Trademark Hearings] ("The term 'trade-
mark' includes any mark which is entitled to registration under the terms of this Act and
whether registered or not.").
45. As shall be discussed below, this definition gave rise to the possibility of cross-over
registration, where subject matter expressly included in the definition of marks eligible for
registration on the supplemental register would become, by incorporation, eligible for
registration as trademarks on the principal register. See infra text accompanying notes 52-
68.
46. See 1927 Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 29 (statement of Mr. Edward S. Rogers)
("[I]t has been the understanding of the Patent Office and the bar in general that anything
by which one man's goods can be distinguished from another, that thing, whatever it may
be, performs the function of a trade-mark, and he should receive the same protection as
with any trade-mark.").
47. See H.R. 82,78th Cong. § 45 (1943), reprinted in Trade-Marks: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Patents, 78th Cong. 14 (1944) [hereinafter 1944
Trademark Hearings] ("The term 'trade-mark' includes any word, name, symbol, or device
or any combination thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify
his goods and distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by others."); see also
Trademark Act of 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427, 443 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A.
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Congress eliminated the possibility that the broad definition of marks
eligible for the supplemental register could be read into the definition
of principal register trademarks.' Through this language, Congress
also expressly incorporated a subject matter limitation.49 Where the
early proposals focused on a single issue-whether the claimed mark
was used to distinguish the applicant's goods-the revised language
expressly focused on two: (i) distinguishing use; and (ii) proper
subject matter, i.e. a "word, name, symbol, or device."5 As a result,
after the revision, for a claimed mark to qualify as a principal register
trademark, it would not be enough that the claimed mark was used to
distinguish the applicant's goods; the claimed mark would also have
to be a "word, name, symbol, or device." Yet, a broad interpretation
of "symbol" would defeat this express change in the statute and read
the revised language as if the revision had not occurred, compelling
evidence that such a broad interpretation is improper.1
For these reasons, it becomes plain that Congress intended the
term "symbol" within the Trademark Act to carry a narrow
interpretation consistent with its historical usage as part of the
common law definition of a technical trademark. We find further
support for this conclusion when we look beyond the language of the
Act itself to the context in which Congress revised the definition of
§ 1127 (West 1999)) ("The term 'trademark' includes any word, name, symbol, or device,
or any combination thereof... used by a manufacturer or merchant.., to identify and
distinguish his goods from those manufactured or sold by others .... ).
48. See Ex parte Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 74, 75-76 (Chief
Exam'r 1952) (noting that Congress adopted separate definitions for "marks" registrable
on the supplemental register, and "trade-marks" registrable on the principal register); see
also Ex parte Boye Needle Co., 100 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124 (Chief Exam'r 1953); Burgess
Battery Co. v. Marzall, 92 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 90, 91 (D.D.C. 1951); Derenberg, supra note
36, at 835 (noting that items that might qualify as trade dress "were deliberately left
outside the definition of a 'trade-mark' in section 45" and are not therefore eligible for
registration on the principal register).
49. For a response to the argument that Congress, by stating that "[a] 'trademark'
includes any word, name, symbol, or device," Trademark Act of 1946, ch. 540,60 Stat. 427,
443 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (West 1999)) (emphasis added), did not
intend this language to limit trademark subject matter, see infra note 189.
50. Compare 1927 Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 29 (statement of Mr. Rogers)
(asserting that presence of distinguishing use alone determined whether something
qualified as trademark), with 1944 Trademark Hearings, supra note 47, at 20 (statement of
Daphne Robert) (recognizing an additional subject matter limitation by testifying that
"[t]rademarks are symbols or names, words or devices which distinguish the products of
one manufacturer from the products of another manufacturer").
51. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 442-43 (1987); Russello v. United
States, 464 U.S. 16,23-24 (1983) ("Where Congress includes limiting language in an earlier
version of a bill but deletes it prior to enactment, it may be presumed that the limitation
was not intended.").
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trademarks eligible for registration on the principal register.
B. Congress Drafted the Act Specifically to Exclude Trade Dress
Congress revised the definition of a principal register trademark
as a result of the repeatedly expressed concern that the Act by
broadly defining "marks" for the supplemental register might open
the door to a similarly broad interpretation of principal register
trademarks. A number of individuals testified that the broad
supplemental register definition might allow for "cross-over"
registration, where trade dress registered as a mark on the
supplemental register would become eligible for the principal register
once it became distinctive. Each thought the possibility of such cross-
over registration represented a dangerous and undesirable expansion
of trademark protection.
In 1927, for example, S.G. Nottingham testified that by
recognizing a configuration of goods as a registrable mark for the
purposes of the supplemental register, the bill might allow
registration of such trade dress on the principal register. 2 He worried
that such cross-over registration would "practically put all of the parts
manufacturers out of business."53 Henry B. Brownell, Chairman of
the Committee on Trade-Marks of the New York Patent Bar
Association, expressed similar concerns:
Now, under the present case there is a proposition to amend the
trade-mark law so that a great many things can be controlled as
trade-marks forever, which heretofore have been controlled,
perhaps, by designs for a limited period.
This proposed bill goes so far as to say that you can register as a
trade-mark a configuration of goods ....
I think that that provision for the registration of configuration of
goods is an exceedingly dangerous one, and I believe that my board
of governors feel the same way.54
Similar sentiments regarding the undesirable possibility of such
cross-over registration were also expressed in the 1938 and 1939
hearings." Witnesses in those hearings expressed their fears that the
52. See Hearings Before the House Comm. on Patents, 69th Cong., 67-69 (1927)
(statement of S.G. Nottingham).
53. Id.
54. 1927 Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 28-29; see also Hearings on H.R. 13486
Before the House Comm. on Patents, 69th Cong. 67-68 (1927) [hereinafter 1927 House
Hearings] (statement of Henry B. Brownell) (explaining cross-over registration possibility
and stating that the provision for the registration of goods is dangerous).
55. See 1938 Trademark Hearings, supra note 43, at 180 (response to concern by
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broad definition of mark and the possibility of cross-over registration
that it created "extended [protection] away [sic] beyond any trade-
mark law,"" would lead to "endless litigation,"* and created a risk of
"real fraud and deceit" because individuals would assert trademark
rights to bluff their competitors "out of using thin[g]s [sic] they have a
perfect right to use. '
In each instance, proponents of the trademark bill denied any
intention to create a possibility of such cross-over registration."
Nevertheless, they agreed over the years to various revisions of the
bill to eliminate that possibility. In 1927, for example, proponents
agreed to add prefatory language stating that the supplemental
register's broad definition of a mark was "for purposes of this
section." 6 From 1927 through 1944, Congress continued to refine this
prefatory language to ensure that the broad definition of mark for the
supplemental register applied only to the supplemental register.61 In
1938, Congress reinforced this distinction between the registers by
rewriting section 2 to limit eligibility for the principal register to
"trade-marks,"'62 where earlier drafts of the trademark bill had
defined eligibility in terms of "marks."6' When witnesses remained
concerned that the distinction between marks and trademarks was not
sufficiently clear to prevent the possibility of cross-over registration,
Congress rewrote the trademark definition to track the language of
Edward S. Rogers); 1939 Trademark Hearings, supra note 44, at 126, 128, (statements of
Mansfield Fuldner and Robert W. Byerly).
56. 1939 Trademark Hearings, supra note 44, at 126, 1939 Trademark Hearings,
(statement of Mansfield C. Fuldner).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 128 (statement of Robert W. Byerly).
59. See id. at 127 (statement of Mr. Rogers); 1938 Trademark Hearings, supra note 43,
at 180 (statement of Mr. Rogers); 1927 Senate Hearings supra note 8, at 29-30, (statement
of Mr. Rogers).
60. 1927 Senate Hearings supra note 8, at 29-30 ("Mr. Rogers. Would it meet your
objection, and that of your association, if it should be stated, 'for purposes of this section,
any mark may include....').
61. Compare H.R. 82,78th Cong. § 23 (1943) ("For the purposes of registration on the
supplemental register, a mark may consist of any trade-mark, symbol, label, package,
configuration of goods. ... "), and Trademark Act of 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427, 435-36
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1091(c) (West 1997)) (same), with H.R. 4744, 76th
Cong. § 23 (1939) ("For the purposes of this register.. . ."), H.R. 9041, 75th Cong. § 25(1938) ("For the purposes of this section...."), and H.R. 6248, 69th Cong. § 5 (1925)
(giving broad definition of mark with no prefatory language).
62. H.R. 9041, 75th Cong. § 2 (1938) ("Trade-marks used in commerce shall be
registered .... ).




It was against this background in December 1942 that the
Department of Justice entered the legislative arena in opposition to
the trademark bill.65  From the outset of its intervention, the
Department of Justice expressed the concern that the trademark bill
improperly expanded the scope of trademark protection and "in the
guise of a procedural trade-mark law change[d] our fundamental
law."6 In its final report, the Department of Justice specifically
identified the bill's potential for allowing cross-over registration for
product shapes, designs, and packaging as posing a direct threat to
desirable competition.67 Within a month of the Department's initial
intervention, Congress rejected the broader definition of trademark
contained in the earlier bills and replaced it with the definition of a
technical trademark given by the common law.6 The context in which
this revision occurred thus confirms that Congress specifically
intended to exclude trade dress from the principal register.
C. The Legislative History Regarding Trade Dress
If there were any ambiguity or room for doubt on this issue, the
legislative history of the Act expressly confirms that trade dress
would not be eligible for registration on the principal register. As
discussed, during the legislative process, various witnesses raised the
64. Compare H.R. 4744, 76th Cong. § 46 (1939) ("The term 'trade-mark' includes any
mark which is entitled to registration under the terms of this Act and whether registered
or not .... "), with Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724, 731 (1905) ("The term 'trade-
mark' includes any mark which is entitled to registration under the terms of this Act and
whether registered or not.").
65. See Trade-Marks: Hearings before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Patents,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1942) [hereinafter 1942 Trademark Hearings] (colloquy inquiring
about the reasons for the Department of Justice's sudden and late appearance in the
course of the trademark bill).
66. Id. at 40-41 (statement of Elliott H. Moyer).
67. See 1944 Trademark Hearings, supra note 47, at 62 (Report of Department of
Justice) ("Section 23 provides for a supplemental register for almost any conceivable
mark .... [After citing the definition of a 'mark' from section 23, the Report continued:]
This broad authorization would appear to extend to functional packages and shapes of
products, unpatentable designs, and to even include combination packages identified by
tying two or more products together... [and] by transfer to the principal register [such
'marks' may] become the exclusive property of a registrant. This result would not only
bypass the patent laws in establishing exclusive rights in the shape and design of articles
and packages, but might well create widespread commercial confusion by imposing on
producers the necessity of avoiding the use of functional designs, shapes, and
packages .... ).
68. See H.R. 82, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. § 45 (1943) ("The term 'trade-mark' includes any
word, name, symbol, or device.., adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant to
identify his goods and distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by others.").
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possibility of cross-over registration. On each occasion, supporters of
the trademark bill denied that the supplemental register's broad
definition of mark would create such a risk. In each case, they
insisted that trade dress would be limited to the supplemental register
and would serve to ensure protection for United States trademark
owners seeking protection abroad, not to broaden domestic
protection.
For example, when the possibility of cross-over registration was
initially raised in 1927, Mr. Rogers, one of the principal drafters and
supporters of the Trademark Act, responded to the concern as
follows:
Mr. Rogers. The section 3(b) to which Mr. Brownell refers is
designed to permit a quick registration. In the case of a trader who
does business in foreign countries, in case his mark is registerable, it
is necessary, of course, to have quick registration in order to carry
on his business. The attempt is to define what is registerable. Now,
in order to give it a proper meaning, it is necessary to establish what
is considered a proper trade-mark in foreign countries. For
example, in France, a distinguishing bottle, or a distinctive
perfumery bottle is considered a trade-mark. Here you have a
different trade-mark. In France you have to have a distinctive
bottle in order to comply with their law as to trade-marks.
Now, in section 2, to which Mr. Brownell refers, that "no mark by
which the goods to which it is applied by the applicant may be
distinguished as to source or origin," etc., that is an exact copy of
the present law. It has received interpretations by the Supreme
Court and is very well understood. That refers to trade-mark
matters under American law.
Section 3(b) refers to trade-marks under foreign law, and the
purpose of that is to protect our own citizens in foreign countries.
And it expressly provides that, so far as the United States is
concerned, all rights with respect to marks registered under this act
have the same protection as the common law affords.
Surely it is not contemplated to transfer the foreign law into the
United States, but fully to protect abroad Americans, the same as
has always been done under the common law."
Similarly, in 1939, Mr. Rogers and Representative Lanham again
considered the broad definition of mark for the supplemental register
and again denied that the language created any possible risk of
enabling cross-over registration.
Mr. Rogers. There is a very definite reason for including the
69. 1927 Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 29.
language [that includes "symbols, labels, package, configuration of
goods, name, word, slogan or phrase" in the definition of marks for
the supplemental register] to which my friend objects. In many
foreign countries, the only way one can get trade-mark protection is
by registration. That is generally so in Latin America. Moreover,
in order to get protection there-and protection depends upon
registration-a foreigner must produce a certificate of registration
from his home land, and one purpose of the supplemental register
is to provide protection in foreign countries. They do not have the
same concept of trade-marks down there that we have; they regard,
many of them, as trade-mark subject-matter things that we consider
designs, or what not.
Now a configuration of goods generally-take Argentina, for
instance-is regarded as a trade-mark; the shape of a perfumery
bottle, or something of that kind.
Mr. Lanham. It would be a design patent here?
Mr. Rogers. It would be a design patent here. If we cannot get
registration in this country for that sort of configuration, we cannot
get any protection in Argentina. Now it is strictly limited for that
purpose in this section, that a trade-mark may be deemed to
include these various things."
Had there been any room for doubt, these statements by the Act's
principal supporters conclusively dispel the notion that Congress
intended to allow trade dress on the principal register.7
D. The Contemporaneous Interpretations and Assistant Commissioner
Daphne Robert Leeds' Torturous Path to Her Rationale
All of these facts lead inexorably to the conclusion that Congress
intended to exclude trade dress from the principal register and to
relegate it exclusively to the supplemental register. Nevertheless, and
despite their statements to Congress during the legislative process,
immediately following the Trademark Act's adoption, some
proponents of broad trademark protection argued that the
Trademark Act did allow for trade dress registration on the principal
70. 1939 Trademark Hearings, supra note 44, at 127; see also 1939 Trademark
Hearings, supra note 44, at 126 (statement of Fritz G. Lanham) ("'Trade-mark' will
frequently appear on a label; but a label, or print, including even a page in a newspaper-I
think the decisions have gone that far-are inherently copyrights.").
71. Although the general purpose of the Trademark Act articulated in its legislative
history might be thought to support trade dress registration, the Court has often cautioned
against "simplistically... [assuming] that whatever furthers the statute's primary objective
must be the law." Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 526 (1987) (per curiam); see
also Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170,183-84 (1993).
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register.' Their argument was that Congress had not been careful
enough in expressing its intent73 and had left a door open for the
cross-over registration of trade dress in section 2(f). For example,
one such proponent, Daphne Robert, argued in her 1947 book, The
New Trademark Manual, that section 2(f) allowed such cross-over
registration as follows:
Packages and configurations of goods which have become
distinctive through use may be registrable on the principal register
under Section 2(f). That section provides that nothing in the Act
shall prevent the registration of marks which have become
distinctive. "Marks" are defined as trade-marks, service marks,
collective marks and certification marks entitled to registration,
whether registered or not. Since packages and configurations of
goods are entitled to registration under the Act [on the
supplemental register], it would seem to follow that if they have
become distinctive they are registrable on the principal register.74
Yet, the PTO, having recently participated in the legislative process
and unwilling as yet to substitute its own preference for Congress's
perfectly clear intention, steadfastly rejected these arguments for the
first twelve years following the Trademark Act's passage. In 1949, for
example, the Commissioner specifically rejected the argument that
the Trademark Act of 1946 expanded "the concept or definition of a
trademark."75  In evaluating the statutory definition of principal
register trademarks, the Commissioner wrote:
[T]he definition appearing in the 1946 Act appears not only entirely
72. See 4 RUDOLF CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-
MARKS § 98.4(d), at 2137 (2d ed. 1950); Stephen P. Ladas, The Lanham Act and
International Trade, 14 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 269,278 (1949).
73. Opponents of the bill early on identified the inconsistent use of "trademark" and
"mark" in the bill as creating an undesirable ambiguity. See 1927 Senate Hearings, supra
note 8, at 29 (statement of Henry B. Brownell) ("Well, the trouble is, under the old act the
word 'mark' was not used, but it contained no such broad definition as the present act. I
believe that when the word 'mark' is used it should have the same meaning as at any other
place. That is the trouble with this bill. It uses 'trade-mark' and then 'mark,' 'mark,' in a
great many places, and when it uses the word 'mark' it means one thing in one place, and
another in another place."). While denying any ulterior motives, see 1927 House Hearings,
supra note 54, at 67 (statement of Mr. Rogers) ("There isn't any ulterior purpose in
putting the word 'configuration' [into the definition of 'mark' for purposes of the
supplemental register]."), proponents of the bill agreed to add language to the prefatory
section of the supplemental register provision to make clear that the broad definition of
mark for the supplemental register applied only to the supplemental register. See 1927
Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 30 (statement of Mr. Rogers) ("Would it meet your
objection, and that of your association, if it should be stated, 'for the purposes of this
section, any mark should include ....").
74. DAPHNE ROBERT, THE NEW TRADEMARK MANUAL 67 (1947).
75. Ex parte Pulitzer Publ'g Co., 82 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 229,231 (Comm'r Pat. 1949).
consistent with the definitions and statements of the nature of trade
marks appearing in many decided cases, both under the Act of 1905
and at common law, but to have been taken almost literally from
such cases and earlier text authority.76
Despite such decisions, companies continued to press their claims
for trade dress registration. The issue came to a head in 1952 when
Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co. ("3M") sought registration
of a tape dispenser on the principal register. Following the line of
argument that Ms. Robert had asserted in her book, 3M argued that
section 2(f) allowed the registration on the principal register of any
"mark which... has become, distinctive of the [applicant's] goods";
that section 45 defined "mark" to include any "trade mark, service
mark, collective mark, or certification mark entitled to registration
under this Act"; that section 23 specifically allowed the registration of
packages and configurations of goods under the Act; and that
therefore packages and configurations of goods were registrable on
the principal register when they had become distinctive.' The PTO
was not persuaded and rejected the cross-over registration
argument.78
Recognizing the differing definitions Congress gave for "marks"
eligible for the supplemental register and "trademarks" eligible for
the principal register, the Examiner-in-Chief held that the broader
supplemental register definition could not properly be read into the
principal register definition.7" Turning to the definition of trademark
more specifically, the Examiner held that it "made no fundamental
change in what is considered to be a trade mark" and noted that the
definition was "similar to definitions found in textbooks and decisions
76. Id at 231; see also Burgess Battery Co. v. Marzall, 92 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 90, 91-92
(D.D.C. 1951); Exparte American Enka Corp., 81 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 476,478 (Comm'r Pat.
1949) ("While applicant apparently regards the definition in section 45 of the Act of 1946
as a new standard for determining what may be a trade mark, it is to be noted that this
definition was apparently taken, directly, or indirectly from that contained in the treatise
on the 'Law of Trade-Marks,' by Francis H. Upton, published in 1860, prior to the
enactment of any provision in Federal law for the registration of trade marks.").
77. Ex parte Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 74, 75 (Chief Exam'r
1952).
78. See id.
79. See id.; see also Ex parte Babson Bros. Co., 103 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 115, 116 (Chief
Exam'r 1954) ("What applicant is attempting to register is a 'configuration of goods' and it
has been held in a number of cases that such configuration, if registrable, cannot be
registered on the Principal Register but only the Supplemental Register."); Ex parte Boye
Needle Co., 100 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124, 124 (Chief Exam'r 1953); Burgess Battery Co., 92
U.S.P.Q. at 91-92 ("The omission of reference to labels or dress of goods in connection
with the principal register and the inclusion thereof on the supplemental register would
seem to indicate an intention to confine such matters to the supplemental register.").
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prior to the Act of 1946."'  As for specific words, such as "device," in
the definition, the Examiner insisted that they could not "aid [the]
applicant."'" As the Examiner explained, these words appeared in the
older definitions of a technical trademark as well, and they should
properly be understood in their legal, and not their ordinary, sense.'
For these reasons, and consistent with Congress's plainly stated
intentions, the PTO relegated trade dress exclusively to the
supplemental register for the first twelve years following the Act's
passage. But by 1958, Daphne Robert had become Daphne R. Leeds
and been appointed Assistant Commissioner of the PTO. In that
position, she had the power if not the legal authority to enact the
result she had advocated in her book, and with a stroke of her
administrative pen, Assistant Commissioner Leeds did so.' In Ex
parte Haig & Haig Ltd., Leeds held that a bottle shape could
constitute a trademark eligible for registration on the principal
register.' In her written opinion, Leeds failed to mention the
common law's longstanding exclusion of trade dress from trademark
protection, Congress's deliberate decision to adopt that exclusion, or
the legislative history where the Act's supporters specifically stated
that the Act would not allow trade dress registration on the principal
register. She omitted her section 2(f) cross-over registration
argument, apparently abandoning it in the face of the 3M decision,
and made no attempt to distinguish the 3M decision or explain where
its reasoning went astray.' In fact, Leeds scarcely acknowledged the
PTO's steadfast exclusion of trade dress from the trademark register
stretching back to the Trademark Act of 1905." Indeed, one searches
80. Ex parte Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 U.S.P.Q. at 76.
81. Id
82. See id.
83. See Ex parte Haig & Haig Ltd., 118 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 229, 230-31 (Comm'r Pat.
1958) ("The fundamental question, then, is not whether or not containers are registrable
on the Principal Register, but it is whether or not what is presented is a trademark-a
symbol or device-identifying applicant's goods and distinguishing them from those of
others .... [T]he contour or conformation of the container may be a trademark-a symbol
or device-which distinguishes the applicant's goods, and it may be registrable on the
Principal Register.").
84. I&
85. In a footnote, Leeds simply asserted that: "Certain broad language in the cited
cases [Ex parte Boye Needle Co. and Ex parte Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co.] appears to
have been unnecessary to the conclusions reached therein." id- at 229 n.2. To be sure,
that is a curious way to refer to the central holdings of those cases.
86. See, e.g., Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Robertson, 25 F.2d 833, 833-34 (4th Cir.
1928) (noting PTO's rejection of claim that diamond pattern in tread of tire could serve as
a trademark); In re Barrett Co., 48 App. D.C. 586, 586-87 (D.C. Cir. 1919) (per curiam)
(affirming refusal to register corrugated surface of roofing materials as trademark under
the opinion in vain for evidence of the rational thought or explanation
usually associated with competent judicial (or quasi-judicial)
writings.' In their place, one finds only Leeds' bald assertion that a
bottle shape may be a "symbol or device" within the meaning of the
Trademark Act-a proposition completely at odds with any
legitimate reading of the statute. 8
H. And One Mistake Becomes Two: The Resulting Mistake
Spiral
On its own, Leeds' misinterpretation of the Act is problematic
enough. Unfortunately, the mistakes have not ended there. Further
misinterpretations have been built upon Leeds' pretense that
Congress intended to allow trade dress on the principal register.'
Ironically, the PTO's decision to follow Congress's will for the first
twelve years following the Act's passage made Leeds' mistake far
more costly than it might otherwise have been. Specifically, by
employing legitimate principles of statutory interpretation, the PTO
closed the section 2(f) loophole that Leeds (and others) had asserted
1905 Act); Herz v. Loewenstein, 40 App. D.C. 277, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1913) (affirming
cancellation of registration for corrugated embossing used to seal individual paper
wrappers for toothpicks on grounds that the "corrugated ends are a part of the
manufactured wrappers").
87. Leeds' only citation of authority is to Marcalus Mfg. Co. v. Watson, 118 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 7 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (per curiam). See Ex parte Haig & Haig Ltd., 118 U.S.P.Q. at
230 n.3. Yet, Marcalus Mfg. Co. dealt with the issue whether "a maroon oval" imprinted
on the packaging of a product and on which a registered word mark and other words were
superimposed could be registered as a trademark. See 118 U.S.P.Q. at 7. The PTO
refused the registration on the grounds that the maroon oval was not in fact serving to
distinguish Marcalus's products, and the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. See id.
Because the case concerned a "symbol" or "device" printed on the packaging and not the
packaging itself, the Marcalus Mfg. Co. decision provides no support for Leeds'
recognition of a bottle shape as a trademark.
88. The fact that she did so to benefit a company that will become her client shortly
after she leaves the PTO makes her decision only that much more objectionable. See Haig
& Haig Ltd. v. Maradel Prods., Inc., 249 F. Supp. 575, 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (listing
"Daphne Robert Leeds" as "of counsel" for plaintiff in a case in which Haig & Haig
sought to enforce the registration that Ms. Leeds had awarded Haig & Haig when she was
Assistant Commissioner); see also Lunney, supra note 1, at 382-84 & n.55 (noting risk of
bias that may arise from the so-called "revolving door," where regulators leave their
government position to undertake employment with the industry they regulated).
89. In another context, Justice Scalia has referred to this process of legal structures
built from mistakes piled on top of other mistakes as "a veritable fairyland castle."
Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 166 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Today's extension
of the Edwards prohibition is the latest stage of prophylaxis built upon prophylaxis,
producing a veritable fairyland castle of imagined constitutional restriction upon law
enforcement.").
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as a path for principal register trade dress protection. Yet, if that path
had been taken, courts, commentators, and practitioners would have
recognized that trade dress had slipped onto the principal register not
through an affirmative decision of Congress, but by exploiting a back-
door loophole Congress had tried to close. Moreover, if trade dress
had entered through section 2(f), this section would have expressly
required a showing of acquired distinctiveness before allowing
principal register registration. When the PTO foreclosed that path,
Leeds, if she was going to have her way on the issue, had no choice
but brazenly to assert that Congress had intended to allow trade dress
on the principal register all along. After she did so, nearly twenty
years passed before a court first granted relief for trade dress
infringement under the Trademark Act,'° providing the time
necessary for courts and practitioners to forget, if they ever knew,
that Leeds' decision had no legitimate basis. After another ten years
had passed, some courts and practitioners began to assume that
Congress had intended the Trademark Act to encompass trade dress
protection all along and began to attribute significance to the absence
of any secondary meaning requirement for, or any functionality
limitation on trade dress protection in, the statutory language.
In Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.,91 for example, the Court
attempted to justify its decision to abandon the longstanding rule that
a plaintiff must prove secondary meaning before she can receive
protection for trade dress by noting that the secondary meaning
requirement in section 2 applies "only to merely descriptive marks."'
"It would be a different matter," the Court wrote, "if there were [a]
textual basis" for treating word and symbol marks differently from
trade dress.93 Failing to perceive such a textual basis, the Court ruled
that trade dress could qualify as inherently distinctive and receive
protection against imitation without any showing of secondary
meaning.' The Court went on to explain that because it could not see
where Congress textually differentiated the rules for trade dress from
the rules for trademarks,' courts should apply the Abercrombie9
90. See Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1216 (8th Cir. 1976).
91. 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
92. Id at 774.
93. Id
94. See id
95. When Congress enacted section 43(a), it prohibited "any false description or
representation, including words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent
the same." Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, § 43(a), 60 Stat. 427, 441 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1998)). Given the rules of statutory construction previously
discussed, see supra text accompanying notes 15-51, Congress presumably intended the
categories for identifying inherently distinctive word marks to trade
dress.' Since that decision, courts have struggled to
apply Abercrombie's generic-descriptive-suggestive-arbitrary-fanciful
categories, developed for word marks, to varying forms of trade dress,
where the Abercrombie categories often make little or no sense.9'
As with Leeds' misinterpretation, the Court's mistake in Two
Pesos, Inc. has begot further mistakes. If, as the Court suggested in
Two Pesos, Inc., there is no textual basis for distinguishing between
trademarks and trade dress, there is also no textual basis for
distinguishing between the shape, coloring, and features of product
packaging and the shape, coloring, and features of the product itself.
As a result, Congress must have intended to extend the same level of
protection to product features, or so the mistaken chain of reasoning
would go. Although there are clear differences between the
packaging of a product and the product itself that would counsel
against such reasoning," the Eighth Circuit has ruled that Two Pesos,
Inc. requires the Abercrombie categories to be applied to both."
The Court, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc.,1
appears to have corrected the Eighth Circuit's mistake.' However,
accepting the pretense that trade dress is the same as word marks has
also led courts to protect product packaging or an article's
appearance, even where there is no evidence that consumers are
relying on the packaging or appearance to identify the product's
term "other symbols" under section 43(a) to carry its technical meaning as a term of art
within trademark law. As discussed, such technical meaning excluded trade dress.
96. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976)
(identifying four categories for word marks: (1) generic; (2) descriptive; (3) suggestive; (4)
arbitrary or fanciful).
97. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763,773 (1992).
98. Compare Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1007-08 (2d Cir. 1995)
(refusing to apply the Abercrombie categories to product features claimed as trade dress),
and Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1441 (3d Cir. 1994)
("The very basis for the trademark taxonomy-the descriptive relationship between the
mark and the product, along with the degree to which the mark describes the product-is
unsuited for application to the product itself."), with Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51
F.3d 780, 785, 787 (8th Cir. 1995) (applying Abercrombie categories to product
configuration trade dress claims).
99. See Knitwaves, Inc., 71 F.3d at 1007-08; Duraco Prods., Inc., 40 F.3d at 1441; see
also Fun-Damental Too, Ltd. v. Gemmy Indus. Corp., 111 F.3d 993 (2d Cir. 1997).
100. See Stuart Hall Co., 51 F.3d at 787 ("We, however, read Two Pesos as resting on a
presumption that 'trade dress' is a single concept that encompasses both product
configuration and packaging, and find that its holding applies to trade dress as a whole,
not merely to packaging.").
101. 120 S. Ct. 1339 (2000).
102. See id. at 1344-45 (rejecting argument that Two Pesos mandates application of
Abercrombie categories to product features or designs claimed as trade dress).
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source.0 3 Traditionally, courts required proof that consumers not
only recognized the claimed trade dress, but were relying on it as an
indicator of source before they would protect trade dress under the
doctrine of unfair competition. As Judge Learned Hand explained in
Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., "it is an absolute
condition to any relief whatever that the plaintiff... show that the
appearance of his wares has in fact come to mean that some particular
person.., makes them, and that the public cares who does make
them, and not merely for their appearance and structure.""' By
focusing on both: (1) recognition, that the dress identified source;
and (2) materiality, that the identification mattered; courts limited
protection to trade dress on which consumers were actually relying to
identify source in making purchasing decisions. 5
Yet, once the pretense of equality between trade dress and
traditional trademarks became accepted, courts began to overlook the
issue of whether the alleged trade dress was serving as a trademark.
If the overall appearance of an article is its trade dress, and if trade
dress is a type of trademark, then a separate inquiry into whether any
given article's appearance is serving as a trademark becomes almost
by definition unnecessary and redundant. But the reduction inherent
in this simple syllogism omits the key consideration. Consumers may
103. For cases granting such protection, see, e.g., Warner Bros. Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc.,
724 F.2d 327, 332 (2d Cir. 1983) (enjoining defendant from producing toy cars that looked
like a car appearing on plaintiff's television show even though there was no showing that
purchasers know or care whether plaintiff sponsored or produced the defendant's cars).
For cases warning of the risk, see Knitwaves, Inc., 71 F.3d at 1007 ("Not only does the
classification of marks into 'generic,' 'descriptive,' 'suggestive,' or 'arbitrary or fanciful'
make little sense when applied to product features, but it would have the unwelcome, and
likely unintended, result of treating a class of product features as 'inherently distinctive,'
and thus eligible for trade dress protection, even though they were never intended to serve
a source-identifying function.").
104. 247 F. 299, 300 (2d Cir. 1917); see also Hygenic Specialties Co. v. H.G. Salzman,
Inc., 302 F.2d 614, 620 (2d Cir. 1962); Blisscraft of Hollywood v. United Plastics Co., 294
F.2d 694, 697 (2d Cir. 1961) ("To establish a secondary meaning... it must be shown
that... purchasers are moved to buy it because of its source."); Gum, Inc. v. Gumakers of
Am., Inc., 136 F.2d 957, 960 (3d Cir. 1943) (same); Huston v. Buckeye Bait Corp., 145 F.
Supp. 600, 607 (S.D. Ohio 1955) (holding that to establish secondary meaning, "[t]here
must be an established identity so that one looks at the product externally and says, 'That
is the article I want because I know the source of its production and I want the article
made by that manufacturer').
105. See, e.g., Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Sandee Mfg. Co., 286 F.2d 596, 600 (7th Cir.
1960) (ruling that findings "that the public was likely to believe that defendant's panels
were plaintiff's Cleartex panels and that the trade associates the appearance of Cleartex
panels with plaintiff and its trademark 'Cleartex"' were insufficient to establish requisite
secondary meaning).
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recognize the shape of a kitchen stand mixer' or a golf course hole,1 7
but that does not necessarily mean that consumers are relying on the
shape to identify the product's source, particularly where the product
is otherwise properly labeled. It is one thing to infer that a
descriptive word has become a trademark when a manufacturer has
long and exclusively used the word in a manner that consumers
recognize as a brand usage. It is quite another to infer that the same
use will transmute a product's appearance into a brand designation:°
Evidence of a period of exclusive use, or of sales, or of publicity, may
establish that a product's appearance or features have become well-
known, but they do not establish that their primary significance has
changed from product feature to trademark.'0 Yet, by mistakenly
assuming that the appearance or packaging of an article is necessarily
a trademark, some courts have overlooked this critical distinction
between traditional trademarks and product features claimed as trade
dress.1
Courts have also relied on congressional silence to undermine
the common law's refusal to protect product features that were
functional."' For example, the Fourth Circuit mistook Congress's
silence regarding functionality in section 1064 as conclusive evidence
that Congress did not intend to allow functionality to be raised as a
basis for canceling an incontestably registered trademark." Although
106. See Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. West Bend Co., 123 F.3d 246,255-56 (5th Cir. 1997).
107. See, e.g., Aromatique, Inc. v. Gold Seal, Inc., 28 F.3d 863, 873 (8th Cir. 1994)
(citation omitted) ("Because the proper inquiry is whether the evidence demonstrates that
the purchasing public identifies the asserted mark with the source of the product, sales
figures alone are inadequate to establish a connection between a product and its source.").
108. See id.
109. See In re Craigmyle, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 791, 793 (T.T.A.B. 1984) (noting that
long and exclusive use does not establish secondary meaning where claimed trade dress is
not used in a manner consumers associate with a trademark usage); In re Kwik Lok Corp.,
217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1245, 1248 (T.T.A.B. 1983) (same); see also PTO, DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1212.05 (revised ed.
1997) (same).
110. See, e.g., Sunbeam Prods., Inc., 123 F.3d at 255-56 (applying section 1052(f)
presumption to secondary meaning issue in case where claimed trademark was a kitchen
stand mixer's appearance even though there was no evidence that consumers actually
relied on appearance as a form of quality certification); Clamp Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Enco Mfg.
Co., 870 F.2d 512, 517 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding secondary meaning based upon sales and
advertising expenditures alone).
111. See Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of Am., Inc., 9 F.3d 1091 (4th Cir. 1993),
overruled by Trademark Law Treaty Implementation Act, 105th Cong., 2d Sess.
§§ 201(a)(2)(A)(ii), 201(a)(4), 201(a)(5) & 201(a)(9), 112 Stat. 3064, 3069-70 (1998)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(e)(5), 1064, 1091(c), 1115(b)(8) (1999)); In re
Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332,1336 (C.C. Pa. 1982).
112. See Shakespeare Co., 9 F.3d at 1097 ("We are persuaded that the rationale
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both the Fourth Circuit and Congress eventually acted to rectify this
mistake,'13 not all of the misinterpretations resulting from misreading
congressional silence regarding functionality have received such
prompt correction. Thus, Congress and the courts have as yet left
uncorrected the mistake that the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals made when it used congressional silence on functionality as a
basis for eviscerating the doctrine. Where historically, a product
feature was legally functional if it affected the desirability of the
good,14 Judge Rich rewrote the doctrine in 1982 to limit its
application to those product features that were "essential" to the use
enunciated by Justice O'Connor in Park 'N' Fly would apply so as to limit cancellation
under § 1119 to the grounds set forth in § 1064. Functionality is not one of such grounds
and it may not be used as a basis for cancellation of a registration more than five years old.
... Perhaps the provisions of the Lanham Act apply only to valid trademarks, and that a
functional trademark is invalid, but it would seem anomalous for Congress to enumerate
specific grounds for cancellation for a five-year-old registration, as it has done in § 1064,
and not list functionality, if it intended functionality to serve as such a ground.").
113. See Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of Am., Inc., 110 F.3d 234, 242-43 (4th Cir.
1997) (accepting by 2-1 decision district court's application of fair use defense in section
1115(b)(4) to encompass copying of functional product features); see also Trademark Law
Treaty Implementation Act, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 201(a)(2)(A)(ii), 201(a)(4), 201(a)(5)
& 201(a)(9), 112 Stat. 3064, 3069-70 (1998) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
1052(e)(5), 1064,1091(c), 1115(b)(8) (1999)).
114. See, e.g., William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526, 531 (1924)
(finding that defendant could imitate exactly chocolate flavoring of medication because it
"serves a substantial and desirable use"); Norwich Pharm. Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 271
F.2d 569, 572 (2d Cir. 1959) (finding color pink for a stomach remedy could be functional
because it was "'designed to present a pleasing appearance to the customer and to the
sufferer"'); Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343-44 (9th Cir. 1952); J.C.
Penney Co. v. H.D. Lee Mercantile Co., 120 F.2d 949, 954 (8th Cir. 1941) ("A feature of
goods is functional.., if it affects their purpose, action or performance; or the facility or
economy of processing, handling or using them.") (quoting Restatement (First) of Torts
§ 742) (1938); Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilbom & Bishop Co., 247 F. 299, 300 (2d Cir. 1917);
Smith v. Krause, 160 F. 270,271 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908) (refusing to recognize words "Merrie
Christmas" woven into a ribbon as a trademark because "the fact that it has 'Merrie
Christmas' inscribed upon it adds a value to it over the value of a plain ribbon"); see also
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 742 & cmt. a (1938) (defining a product feature as
functional if it "affects their purpose, action or performance, or the facility or economy of
processing, handling, or using them" and defining "affects" as "contributes to"). The
Seventh Circuit worries that this test would restrict the subject matter eligible for
protection as a trademark. See W.T. Rogers Co. v. Wendell R. Keene & Keene Mfg., 778
F.2d 334, 341 (7th Cir. 1985) ("[Under the district court's instruction,] if a particular design
feature had two equally important purposes, one to please consumers and the other to
identify the manufacturer, it would be functional and could not be trademarked. But a
trademark, especially when it is part of the product, rather than being just the brand name,
is bound to be selected in part to be pleasing; so this definition of functionality could rule
out trademark protection for design features."). Of course, historically, that was precisely
the purpose of the functionality doctrine.
or purpose of the good.115 By restricting the reach of functionality to
those designs or features that were "the best or one of a few superior
designs available,"" 6 Judge Rich radically expanded the subject
matter eligible for protection as a trademark. As justification, Judge
Rich offered only a flawed policy analysis 7 and, quoting himself, the
proposition that the "requirement of 'nonfunctionality' is not
mandated by statute, but 'is deduced entirely from court decisions."'
118
Now that Congress has given the functionality doctrine (but not trade
dress itself) an express place in the Trademark Act, it will be
interesting to see whether courts will restore the functionality
doctrine to its traditional scope.1 9
I. The Costs and Benefits of Principal Register Trade Dress
Protection
In addition to relying on perceived congressional intent, courts
have also proffered superficial policy analyses as justifications for
recognizing trade dress as principal register subject matter. In this
vein, courts have typically asserted, first, that trade dress can act like a
traditional trademark, helping consumers identify and distinguish
products,2 ° and second, that so long as the functionality doctrine
115. See In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d at 1340-41.116. Id. at 1341.
117. See infra text accompanying notes 121-175.
118. See In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d at 1336 (quoting In re Mogen
David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925,932 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (Rich, J., concurring)).
119. See Trademark Law Treaty Implementation Act, 105th Cong., 2d Sess.
§§ 201(a)(2)(A)(ii), 201(a)(4), 201(a)(5), & 201(a)(9), 112 Stat. 3064, 3069-70 (1998)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(e), 1064, 1091(c), 1115(b)(8) (1999)).
Proponents of broad trade dress protection face something of a catch-22 situation here. If
proponents of broad trademark protection insist that "functionality" be given the narrow
legal meaning Judge Rich accorded it, rather than its broader ordinary meaning, then a
similar rule should presumably be followed for the words "symbol" and "device" in the
definition of principal register trademarks. As a result, trying to argue for a narrow
interpretation of functionality should, if consistent rules are followed, relegate trade dress
(as Congress intended) exclusively to the supplemental register. On the other hand, if all
of these terms are given their ordinary meaning, then the full breadth of the common law's
functionality doctrine should be restored. Also, Congress's decision to add a functionality
doctrine to the statute does not necessarily imply Congress's recognition of trade dress
protection. Although primarily directed at trade dress, the functionality doctrine has long
applied to word marks as well. See Smith, 160 F. at 271 (refusing to recognize words
"Merrie Christmas" woven into a ribbon as a trademark because "the fact that it has
'Merrie Christmas' inscribed upon it adds a value to it over the value of a plain ribbon").
120. See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162-64 (1995)
(suggesting that color can serve to distinguish products); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana,
Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 774 (1992) ("Protection of trade dress, no less than of trademarks,
serves the Act's purpose to 'secure to the owner of the mark the goodwill of his business
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excludes protection for those features that represent "the best or one
of a few superior designs available,.1 . trade dress protection will
generate no anticompetitive consequences. However, this analysis
fails to justify recognition of trade dress as principal register subject
matter for two reasons. First, the Court has repeatedly warned
against "simplistically... assuming that whatever furthers the
statute's primary objective must be the law."" Second, the policy
analysis that courts have offered both overstates the benefits that
such recognition achieves and understates its true cost. A more
careful analysis of the policies implicated by trademark protection
fully justifies distinguishing between the protection of words and
symbols as trademarks and the protection of trade dress under
principles of unfair competition.
A. The Minimal Benefits and High Costs of Recognizing Trade Dress as
Principal Register Trademarks
As for the benefits of elevating trade dress to the principal
register, courts appear to assume that because trade dress can serve to
identify source, protecting trade dress generates the same benefits as
protecting traditional trademarks. In Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods.
Co., for example, the Supreme Court asserted that color deserves
recognition as a principal register trademark because "[i]t is the
source-distinguishing ability of a mark-not its ontological status as
color, shape, fragrance, word, or sign-that permits it to serve [as a
trademark]."1" Putting to one side the fact that Congress expressly
amended the Trademark Act during the legislative process to make
"ontological status" relevant,124 this reasoning overstates the benefits
from trade dress protection for three reasons. First, the mere
possibility that trade dress can serve a trademark function does not
mean that a product feature or design is serving as a trademark in any
given case. Yet, the recognition of trade dress as principal register
and to protect the ability of consumers to distinguish among competing producers."')
(quoting Park 'N' Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985)).
121. In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d at 1341.
122. Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525-26 (1987) (per curiam) ("[N]o
legislation pursues its purposes at all costs. Deciding what competing values will or will
not be sacrificed to the achievement of a particular objective is the very essence of
legislative choice-and it frustrates rather than effectuates legislative intent simplistically
to assume that whatever furthers the statute's primary objective must be the law."); see
also Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 183-84 (1993) (refusing to recognize aiding and
abetting liability despite clause stating that Act's remedies were to be liberally construed).
123. 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995).
124. See supra text accompanying notes 42-51.
August 2000]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
subject matter encourages the assumption that some aspect of a
product or its packaging claimed as trade dress is necessarily serving a
trademark function. This assumption is unwarranted, particularly
when a party claims a product's features or configuration, rather than
its packaging, as trade dress. As the Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition has recognized, consumers seldom perceive and rely on
product configuration or product features as a source of information
regarding the product, rather than as an aspect of the product itself."
To address this, the common law required proof that consumers were
relying on the claimed trade dress to identify a product's source and
was careful not to transmute evidence that the plaintiff had made a
particular product feature, shape, or configuration popular into proof
"that the public demand [was] for the plaintiff's product as such. ',1 6
With the recognition of trade dress as a trademark, this care has
largely disappeared. Accepting the pretense that trade dress is a
trademark, some courts have extended protection to dress based
upon popularity alone, without requiring any proof that consumers
were relying on the claimed dress to identify the product's source. 27
Second, even where trade dress serves an informational role,
trade dress ordinarily is not the only means for conveying the relevant
information." So long as a producer can properly label her goods
125. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 16 cmt. b (1995).
126. Gum, Inc. v. Gumakers of Am., Inc., 136 F.2d 957, 960 (3d Cir. 1943) ("From this
evidence it would be possible to conclude that the plaintiff by its pioneer work in the field
created the desire in the public for bubble gum having the appearance of [the plaintiff's
gum], that the defendant copied that appearance and profited by the public demand which
the plaintiff had aroused. This evidence would not, however, justify a finding that the
public associates with the plaintiff bubble gum having the appearance of the plaintiff['s]
bubble gum... or that the public demand is for the plaintiffs product as such."); Lewis v.
Vendome Bags, Inc., 108 F.2d 16, 18 (2d Cir. 1939) ("Nor does the fact that bags of the
appearance of exhibit 3 have become popular as a result of the plaintiffs advertising make
the defendant's duplication of them a tort.").
127. Compare A.C. Gilbert Co. v. Shemitz, 45 F.2d 98, 99 (2d Cir. 1930) (ruling that
similarity resulting from imitation and "many sales and much advertising" did not
establish secondary meaning in design of article), and General Time Instruments Corp. v.
United States Time Corp., 165 F.2d 853, 854-55 (2d Cir. 1998) (ruling that sale of 3,000,000
clocks and expenditure of two million dollars in advertising from 1939 to 1946 was
insufficient to establish secondary meaning), with Clamp Mfg. Co. v. Enco Mfg. Co., 870
F.2d 512, 512, 517 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding secondary meaning based upon sales and
advertising expenditures alone).
128. See Gum, Inc., 136 F.2d at 960 (noting that the parties had both printed their
respective corporate names on their packaging); Turner & Seymour Mfg. Co. v. A & J
Mfg. Co., 20 F.2d 298, 301 (2d. Cir. 1927) (denying claim for unfair competition as a result
of defendant's imitation of plaintiff's coloring scheme based upon defendant's proper
labeling of its products, and stating: "Where attention by the purchaser of the article will
enable him to at once distinguish one from the other, a court of equity will not interfere").
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and receive protection for her word and symbol trademarks, the
producer has alternative means to convey source-related information
to consumers. '29 Although a second source for the same information
has value, because some inattentive consumers may miss the first, the
benefits consumers derive from the second source is sharply less than
that of the primary source because the second source simply
duplicates information already available.'m
Third, the assumption that trade dress is a trademark encourages
a more property-like enforcement regime, where every technical
trespass is actionable, rather than a more deception-based regime,
where the focus is on consumer deception over the longer term.
When trade dress was protected exclusively under the doctrine of
unfair competition, courts recognized that a certain amount of initial
confusion was inevitable when a competitor began offering a product
that had previously been offered exclusively by one company.'
Despite this initial confusion, they allowed imitation and competitive
entry under the assumption that any initial confusion would work
itself out as consumers and merchants became accustomed to the
newly competitive market.ln Unfortunately, as trademark has lost its
deception-based focus, courts have increasingly protected trademarks
against minor, often trivial infractions, where the likelihood of any
129. See Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234,238-39 (1964) (limiting
state law protection of product designs or configurations to requirement of proper
labeling); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232-33 (1964) (holding that
state may require proper labeling but may not prohibit the copying of the article itself
"when the article is unpatented and uncopyrighted").
130. See Lunney, supra note 1, at 435-36. Some courts and commentators make the
mistake of assuming that additional marks each conveying the same information somehow
equals more information. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Reconceptualizing the Inherent
Distinctiveness of Product Design Trade Dress, 75 N.C. L. REV. 471, 561 (1997)
("Consumers benefit from the greatest number of indicia by which to distinguish products:
some may focus more strongly on words, while others on shapes. There is no reason to
dissuade consumers from exercising their purchasing decisions on the basis of additional
valuable information.").
131. See Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 121 (1938); American Safety
Table Co. v. Schreiber, 269 F.2d 255, 273 (2d Cir. 1959) ("Since a certain amount of
confusion as to source was inherent in the process of imitation, the courts have developed
a body of principles by which to determine whether or not the confusion was
permissible."); Chas. D. Briddell, Inc. v. Alglobe Trading Corp., 194 F.2d 416, 419-20 (2d
Cir. 1952); General Time, 165 F.2d at 854; Selchow & Righter Co. v. Western Printing &
Lithographing Co., 142 F.2d 707, 709 (7th Cir. 1944); Grosjean v. Panther-Prance Rubber
Co., 26 F. Supp. 344,352 (D. Mass. 1939) ("Assuming the admissibility of all the evidence
proffered on this subject,.., it all shows only isolated cases of confusion such as would
naturally result where a new firm enters a field long exclusively occupied by another."),
affd, 113 F.2d 252 (1st Cir. 1940).
132. See cases cited supra note 131.
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long-term confusion is negligible." With the recognition of trade
dress as trademarks, some courts have extended such property-based
protection to trade dress as well. Yet, the benefits from such
protection are slight, given that the confusion would have resolved
itself without the law's intervention in any event.
Given these considerations, protection of trade dress generates
some real benefit for consumers only in those cases where purchasers
and prospective purchasers of a product: (1) are relying on its dress
to distinguish its source; (2) have no other means readily available for
distinguishing its source; and (3) are unlikely over time to develop the
ability to distinguish between similar or similarly dressed products.
To be sure, there may be cases where trade dress satisfies these three
requirements and merits protection, but such cases are likely to
represent the exception rather than the rule. Protection extended to
trade dress under unfair competition law tended to limit protection to
such exceptional cases, because such protection required proof that
trade dress serves as a material source of information regarding a
product.' In contrast, the erroneous conclusion that trade dress is a
trademark has led to the assumption of distinctiveness for some trade
dress;" it allows trade dress through registration to obtain a
conclusive presumption of distinctiveness; 13 6 and it has encouraged
fact-finders to transmute popularity into distinctiveness.' In each
133. See, e.g., Warner Bros., Inc., v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 327, 332 (2d Cir. 1983)
(enjoining defendant from producing toy cars that looked like a car appearing on
plaintiff's television show even though there was no showing that purchasers knew or
cared whether plaintiff sponsored or produced the defendant's cars).
134. See Sawyer v. Horn, 1 F. 24, 31-32 (C.C.D. Md. 1880) (finding unfair competition
where the defendant had "designedly so put up, labeled and packed his goods that
purchasers, for whose use they are intended, are misled and deceived, and do get [the
defendant's product], when they desire and suppose they are getting [the plaintiff's]").
135. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763,773-74 (1992); Stuart Hall
Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780,785-88 (8th Cir. 1995) (applying Abercrombie categories
to product configuration trade dress claims). Moreover, even where the law would
formally require proof of secondary meaning, see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros.,
Inc., 120 S. Ct. 1339, 1346 (2000) (requiring such proof for product designs claimed as
trade dress), the PTO sometimes fails to enforce the requirement. See, e.g., Park 'N' Fly,
Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The mark
'Park 'n Fly' is at best merely descriptive in the context of airport parking.... Petitioner
never submitted any such proof [of secondary meaning] to the Commissioner, or indeed to
the District Court in this case."). Allowing the registration of trade dress therefore
heightens the risk that non-source-identifying matter will receive trademark protection.
136. See Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of Am., Inc., 9 F.3d 1091, 1094-95 (4th Cir.
1993) (applying conclusive presumption of distinctiveness for clear fiberglass tip on fishing
rod where registration of tip as trademark on the principal register had become
incontestable).
137. See, e.g., Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. West Bend Co., 123 F.3d 246, 254-55 (5th Cir.
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such case, treating trade dress as a trademark enables the dress to
receive protection even where the dress serves no important source-
identification role. Assuming that trade dress is a trademark also
encourages more property-like protection of trade dress, which
ignores the availability of alternative means for distinguishing a
product's source' and the ability of consumers to learn to distinguish
between two similar or similarly packaged products over time. For
these reasons, protecting trade dress under the doctrine of unfair
competition, rather than as a trademark, better fits the circumstances
where trade dress protection generates real benefits for consumers.
As to the second issue, some courts have assumed that extending
protection to trade dress will generate no anticompetitive effects so
long as it does not "foreclose competition." The Court has offered
reassurances that the functionality doctrine will preclude
anticompetitive results, in both Two Pesos, Inc.39 and again in
Qualitex Co.1"' However, these reassurances are curiously unrealistic.
The simple fact is that before the Court's decision in Two Pesos, Inc.,
there were two upscale, drive-through Mexican restaurants competing
1997) (finding distinctiveness on the basis of length of use, advertising, and sales volume
even though there was no evidence that consumers actually relied on appearance of mixer
to identify product's source); Clamp Mfg. Co. v. Enco Mfg. Co., 870 F.2d 512,517 (9th Cir.
1989) (finding secondary meaning based upon sales and advertising expenditures alone).
138. For example, in Dogloo, Inc. v. Doskocil Mfg. Co., 893 F. Supp. 911, 921-22 (C.D.
Cal. 1995), the district court enjoined the imitation of a successful igloo-shaped doghouse
under trademark law based upon the similarity between the shapes of the plaintiff's and
defendant's respective products. In enjoining the imitation, the district court relied on a
survey where some of the labeling that ordinarily accompanied the product had been
removed. See id. at 916; see also Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d
254, 257-58 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding likelihood of confusion despite distinct labeling);
Boston Prof'l Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc. 510 F.2d 1004, 1012 (5th
Cir. 1975) (finding infringement even where consumers were not confused as to source).
Some courts go further and find that disclaimers or other labeling efforts intended to
ensure proper source identification are themselves evidence of infringement. See Pebble
Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I, Ltd., 942 F. Supp. 1513, 1544, 1550 n.35 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (using
own name in conjunction with another's mark and including disclaimers in advertising are
evidence that support finding of likelihood of confusion), affd, 155 F.3d 526 (5th Cir.
1998).
139. 505 U.S. at 774-75 ("Suggestions that under the Fifth Circuit's law, the initial user
of any shape or design would cut off competition from products of like design and shape
are not persuasive. Only nonfunctional, distinctive trade dress is protected under § 43(a).
The Fifth Circuit holds that a design is legally functional, and thus unprotectible, if it is
one of a limited number of equally efficient options available to competitors and free
competition would be unduly hindered by according the design trademark protection.").
140. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995) ("The functionality
doctrine prevents trademark law, which seeks to promote competition by protecting a
firm's reputation, from instead inhibiting legitimate competition by allowing a producer to
control a useful product feature.").
in Houston, Austin, Dallas, and El Paso.4' After the decision, there
was only one. 4' Similarly, in Qualitex Co., the Court's decision
foreclosed Jacobson's attempt to enter the dry-cleaning pad market
and thereby eliminated a would-be competitor to the market's
dominant firm."'
The Qualitex Court's citation to Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc.'"
is even more puzzling. Although the Court identified Deere & Co. as
a good example of how courts had been using the functionality
doctrine to ensure competition,45  trademark attorneys and
commentators had always considered the decision to be something of
an aberration."'6 Moreover, despite citing the decision with approval,
the Court itself rejects the essential reasoning of the case. In Deere &
Co., the court held that a particular shade of green that John Deere
had long used for its farm equipment (and known throughout the
farming community as "John Deere green") was functional, and so
permitted a competitor to market its farming equipment in the same
color. The Deere & Co. court justified this finding by citing the
farmer's desire for his equipment's coloring to match.147 Yet, if we
look beneath that desire, we will almost certainly find that the farmer
desired the color match not to satisfy his fashion sense, but because it
enabled him to create the appearance of having bought a Deere while
paying a presumably lower price. Such a ruling is not only
inconsistent with the results other courts have reached (in the
apparent belief that trademark law prohibits offering consumers such
a choice)," but was rejected by the Qualitex Court itself. While
141. Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 765.
142. See Sara Calian, Composite Index Hits Record 686.78, up Z33 on Rally in
Technology Stocks, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 1993, at C6 (noting that Two Pesos signed a
letter of intent to sell its 34 unit chain of restaurants to Taco Cabana following Court's
ruling).
143. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1457, 1458 (C.D.
Cal. 1991) (recognizing Qualitex's market dominance by finding that "[n]ineteen out of
twenty-two award winning dry cleaners according to the American Drycleaner magazine,
have used the Qualitex press pad for the last twenty years"), rev'd on other grounds, 13
F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 514 U.S. 159 (1995).
144. 560 F. Supp. 85, 98 (S.D. Iowa 1982), affd, 721 F.2d 253 (8th Cir. 1983).
145. Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 169-70.
146. Indeed, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board had expressly rejected Deere &
Co.'s reasoning and allowed John Deere to register the color green for its farm equipment.
See In re Deere & Co., 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1401,1404 (T.T.A.B. 1988).
147. In re Deere & Co., 560 F. Supp. at 98.
148. See United States v. Hon, 904 F.2d 803, 804 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Yamin,
868 F.2d 130, 130 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Gantos, 817 F.2d 41, 43 (8th Cir. 1987)
(accepting reasoning and conclusion of Torkington and finding likelihood of confusion
even where seller expressly informed buyer that the item was an imitation); see also
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Deere & Co. is not an exact parallel to Qualitex Co., both courts faced
a situation where consumers demanded a certain color product
because of the dominant firm's long use of the color. Both courts had
to determine whether to allow a competitor to copy the color in order
to facilitate competitive entry. Yet, where Deere & Co. allowed the
copying, the Qualitex Court prohibited it, despite citing Deere & Co.
with approval.
At a more general level, the Court in both Two Pesos, Inc. and
Qualitex Co. has entrusted consumer welfare to a triumvirate-de
jure functionality, the availability of alternative designs, and the
notion of "effective competition" -that conceals rather than
illuminates trade dress protection's true costs. With respect to de jure
functionality, this legal doctrine fails to recognize that competition is
a function of consumer perception, not reality. While actual
superiority of design has some relevance, it is not the key issue. For
there to be competition between two designs, the question is not
whether one design is superior, but whether consumers perceive a
given design as superior. The same principle would apply if the
claimed mark were a product feature, a color, or a style of packaging.
Thus, even if a color is simply added as a dye and serves no functional
purpose,149 that fact is not controlling. The question is whether
substantially all consumers realize that the color is irrelevant to the
product's function.1" Long use or extensive advertising, particularly
by a dominant firm, may lead consumers to associate a color with a
United States v. Torkington, 812 F.2d 1347, 1352-53 (11th Cir. 1987) (expanding criminal
liability for trademark infringement to encompass such on-looker confusion); Lois
Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 871, 871-73 (2d Cir. 1986)
(finding trademark infringement where defendant manufactured a product that on-lookers
might confuse with plaintiff's); Montres Rolex, S.A. v. Snyder, 718 F.2d 524, 527-28 (2d
Cir. 1983) (same); Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 632 F.2d 817, 822 (9th Cir. 1980)
(same); A.T. Cross Co. v. Jonathan Bradley Pens, Inc., 470 F.2d 689, 692 (2d Cir. 1972)
(same); Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-LeCoultre Watches,
Inc., 221 F.2d 464,466 (2d Cir. 1955) (same); Rolex Watch U.S.A. v. Canner, 645 F. Supp.
484, 493-94 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (same); Rolls-Royce Motors Ltd. v. A & A Fiberglass, Inc.,
428 F. Supp. 689, 694 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (same); Malla Pollack, Your Image is My Image:
When Advertising Dedicates Trademarks to the Public Domain-With an Example from
the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, 14 CARDOZO L. REv. 1391, 1451-74 (1993)
(discussing approach).
149. See Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 166 (noting that the color green-gold serves no other
function than identifying source); In re Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116,
1123 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (noting that color pink was simply added to fiberglass insulation as a
dye).
150. On this issue, it is interesting to note that Owens-Coming never expressly states in
its advertisements that the color is irrelevant to function or that the color is simply added
as a marketing gimmick.
product's desirable characteristics, rather than with the product's
source."' Moreover, consumers are risk averse. They will often
prefer a product in the form to which they have become accustomed
simply because it is the form to which they have become
accustomed.'5 2
As for the availability of alternative designs, this concept
mistakes rivalry for competition. Products "compete" in the
economic sense only when substantially all consumers are indifferent
to them and will switch without hesitation from one product to
another in response to any increase in the price of the first. Products
are "rivals" in the economic sense when a not insubstantial number of
consumers have some preference for one product over the other(s).'53
Because of their preference, these consumers will not as readily
151. On a personal note, by the time my wife and I built our first home in 1992, Owens-
Corning's advertisements for its fiberglass insulation had persuaded me that pink
insulation was superior for its own sake, rather than superior because of its source. I cared
nothing for who made the pink insulation, but I believed that good insulation was
supposed to be pink.
152. For that reason, courts under the common law refused to extend protection to such
features. See Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 120 (1938) ("Where an
article may be manufactured by all, a particular manufacturer can no more assert exclusive
rights in a form in which the public has become accustomed to see the article and which, in
the minds of the public, is primarily associated with the article rather than a particular
producer, than it can in the case of a name with similar connections in the public mind.").
On the power of buying habits, see generally JEAN JACQUES LAMBIN, ADVERTISING,
COMPETITION AND MARKET CONDUCT IN OLIGOPOLY OVER TIME 115 (1976) ("Brand
loyalty or consumer inertia may augment the height of the barrier of entry for new firms.
The results clearly show that a substantial degree of inertia exists in the sample markets,
and a potential entrant in these markets will have to incur the cost of overcoming this
consumer inertia. Since these markets are advertising intensive, this is prima facie
evidence that advertising helps erect entry barriers."); Kurt Borchardt, Are Trademarks an
Antitrust Problem?, 31 GEO. L.J. 245, 246 (1943) ("In spite of this characterization of a
trade-mark as a competitive device, Rogers admits a little later that the preference which a
buyer might have for Quaker Oats is a habit which 'is worth something to the producer of
the goods to whose use we have become habituated. It eliminates competition for to us
there is nothing "just as good."'") (quoting EDWARD S. ROGERS, GOODWILL, TRADE-
MARKS AND UNFAIR TRADING 56 (1914)) (emphasis supplied by Borchardt); Dale Hein
& Cathy Durham, A Test of the Habit Formation Hypothesis Using Household Data, 73
REV. ECON. & STAT. 189 (1991) (noting traditional assumption that habit plays central
role in consumer buying, critiquing preexisting empirical studies that attempt to measure
habit effect, proposing new approach that provides lower estimate of the influence of habit
effects, but concluding that "[habit effects] are still highly significant and play an
important role in consumer behavior").
153. See eg., PAUL SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 492 (6th ed. 1964) ("To the economist,
perfect competition does not mean spirited rivalry among cigarette advertisers. It does
not mean a titanic struggle in which Cornelius Vanderbilt cuts his freight fare on the New
York Central below Daniel Drew's cut-price rates quoted for the Erie Railroad. It does
not mean two or more textbook publishers or chemical companies vying with one another
to have the best research, quality, and trade marks.").
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switch given a price increase on their preferred product. As a result,
that product's producer (or perhaps each product's producer)"' will
be able to set her price somewhat above a competitive level.155 The
alternative design gloss that courts have added to the functionality
doctrine may ensure rivalry, but it does not ensure competition. A
round grill'56 or a particular ornamental plate design 57 may work no
better or be no more attractive than some other design, yet some
consumers may nevertheless prefer the round grill or the particular
plate design. At the same time, other consumers may prefer a square
grill or some other plate design. In that sense, the first design is not
"better" than the second. But so long as there are some consumers
who prefer one design or the other, assigning an exclusive right to
manufacture that design to one producer will lead to
supracompetitive pricing.'58
The alternative design analysis also overlooks the fact that
alternative designs inevitably cost something to develop. These
increased costs are passed on to consumers in two ways. First, the
new entrant will need to increase her prices to cover the increased
cost, risk, and uncertainty associated with developing the alternative
design. Forcing a later entrant to develop an alternative design thus
means higher prices for the later entrant's products. Second, to the
extent that some consumers would turn to the later entrants as
substitutes for the original design, the price for later entries sets a
competitive pricing bar that the original design must meet (or
approach) to avoid losing undue sales to the later entrants. Higher
prices for the later entries thus mean higher prices for the original
154. See EDWARD H. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION
78, 88-89, 286-87 (8th ed. 1962) (explaining that prices will be higher with increased
product differentiation and that an increase in the number of sellers will not necessarily
reduce prices to a competitive level).
155. Some economists have asserted that even in a competitive market, prices will need
to be somewhat above marginal cost in order to provide producers with the proper
incentive to maintain quality over time. See Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role
of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615, 618-25
(1981). For purposes of this article, I am willing to accept that proposition. When the text
refers to prices above a competitive level or supracompetitive pricing, I am referring to
prices somewhat higher than a competitive level, whether that level be marginal cost or
something slightly above it, and which result from legally forced product differentiation.
156. See In re Weber-Stephen Prods. Co., 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1659 (T.T.A.B. 1987)
(finding circular design of grill with tripod legs not functional).
157. Compare Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339,343 (9th Cir. 1952) (holding
that attractive plate design is functional and cannot receive protection as trademark or
under unfair competition), with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17
cmt. c, illus. (1995) (suggesting opposite outcome).
158. See CHAMBERLIN, supra note 154, at 59-62,78,88.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
design as well.
In the end, the possibility that there are, in theory, equally
attractive designs that might be created does not adequately
safeguard consumer welfare. Two requirements must be met for the
availability of an alternative design to establish that protecting a given
design as a trademark would impose only minimal costs on
consumers. First, there must be another design, readily identifiable or
known, that could be adopted at no more cost than imitating the
design claimed as a trademark. Second, substantially all consumers
must consider the alternative design to be just as perfect a substitute
for the original, as they would consider a more exact imitation of the
original. If the alleged alternative would cost something more to
develop, or would not prove as perfect a substitute, then the
availability of any number of alternative designs will not be sufficient
to avoid anticompetitive consequences.
For these reasons, accepting the pretense of trade dress as
trademark has cost consumers dearly. By increasing costs for would-
be competitors and requiring would-be competitors to differentiate
clearly their products from the market leaders, today's trade dress
protection has impaired the market's ability to produce what
consumers desire at a reasonable price. In some cases, trade dress
protection increases would-be competitors' costs and requires product
differentiation to such an extent that the producer of a popular design
is able to impose and profitably maintain "a small but significant and
nontransitory" price increase, thereby creating monopoly."' In other
cases, trade dress protection may not insulate a producer sufficiently
from competitive pressures to justify labeling the result a monopoly,
but the costs to consumers can remain substantial. And we ought not
conceal those costs by referring to the result as "effective
competition." In a six trillion dollar economy, trade dress protection
that enables producers to increase prices by only 0.5 percent would
still cost consumers thirty billion dollars per year."
159. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES § 1.11 (1992); see also Satellite Television & Associated Resources, Inc. v.
Continental Cablevision of Va., Inc., 714 F.2d 351,355 n.5 (4th Cir. 1983) (applying
Guidelines approach to define relevant product market); Bon-Ton Stores, Inc. v. May
Dept. Stores Co., 881 F. Supp. 860,872 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (using Guidelines approach to
define relevant product market).
160. Studies have shown that the protection of word and symbol marks alone may
enable a leading brand to charge prices four to sixty-seven percent above the average price
for private-label items of comparable quality. See F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 330-32 (1970). For word and symbol
marks, some part of this increase may be attributable to the guarantee of uniform quality a
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Moreover, the costs of recognizing trade dress protection as
principal register subject matter are compounded by three additional
considerations. First, whatever protection the law provides will be
over-enforced. In part, over-enforcement results from a common, but
mistaken, belief that creation entails ownership-a belief that too
often leads plaintiffs to claim ownership far beyond the limited
boundaries set by law. In part, over-enforcement results from others
who, fully aware of the questionable legal status of their ownership
claims, nevertheless file or threaten suit either to bluff would-be
competitors out of a market161 or simply to impose the heavy costs of
litigation upon them. Courts play a role in over-enforcement as
well, too often falling prey themselves to the creation equals
ownership impulse or proving unable to see past their instinctive
dislike of the "copyist's opportunism.""6
Second, exacerbating this difficulty is the lack of an organized
bar dedicated to the defense of trademark infringement cases. While
heavily advertised brand may convey. See id. at 332. Because alternatives are more
expensive and difficult to create, trade dress protection may enable the owners of popular
brands to impose similar price increases, but with diminished benefits from the offsetting
guarantee function of word and symbol marks. Thus, the 0.5% price increase in the text
likely understates the amount trade dress protection forces consumers to pay.
161. See, e.g., 1939 Trademark Hearings, supra note 44, at 128-29 (statement of Mr.
Byerly) (noting use of registrations under the act of 1920 that "meant absolutely nothing"
to persuade others to give up something "they have a perfect right to use").
162. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 1185,
1190, 1198, 1207 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 636 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir. 1980). In that case, P&G
brought suit against J&J for trademark infringement based upon J&J's plans to market an
ASSURE brand tampon. P&G had no trademark claim based upon its principal tampon
market, because the RELY mark it was using was too different from the ASSURE market
J&J planned to use to create any plausible claim of likelihood of confusion. Therefore,
P&G alleged trademark infringement of mark SURE for anti-perspirant. In commenting
on P&G's motives in bringing the suit, the court wrote that:
[A] victory for P&G in this lawsuit would benefit the Rely tampon far more than
any other commercial interest of P&G. It would set back one of Rely's strongest
competitors for at least 1 1/2 years (and possibly much more). In authorizing this
lawsuit, P&G's executives cannot have been unaware of the enormous potential
value of such a victory to the Rely tampon.
Id. at 1207.
163. R.G. Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 568 (9th Cir. 1968); Ralph S. Brown, Jr.,
Symposium-Product Simulation: A Right or A Wrong?, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1216, 1227
(1964) ("The imperfect stabilization of the concept of functionality (and related issues)
probably stemmed, not from judicial obtuseness, but from the sort of pressures typified by
the Seventh Circuit decisions now reversed [in Sears and Compco]. The short-comings of
those decisions are not the result of ineptitude; they are rather still another reflection of
what I have several times referred to as a persistent urge to create some general protection
against copiers. That urge has never achieved dominant expression in the cases. But it
runs along like the Manichean heresy, forever pitting the forces of light against the alleged
forces of darkness.").
there is an organized trademark bar, it is predominantly a plaintiff's
bar dedicated to and with a systematic interest in obtaining trademark
protection for their clients whenever and wherever available." 4
Ethical and practical considerations,165 as well as the blinders obtained
through years of plaintiff's practice, often render such attorneys less
effective at defending infringement cases. In some cases, the working
assumptions of a plaintiff's lawyer can lead to fatal concessions, such
as those made by defendant's counsel in the Two Pesos case.16 More
generally, the lack of a systematic effort to evaluate the Trademark
Act and its accompanying judicial interpretation from a defense
perspective means that defense-oriented arguments are made neither
early nor often in the law's development. As a result, when defense-
oriented interpretations are eventually argued or raised sua sponte by
164. Professor Brown noted this problem in his statement to the House Subcommittee
that was considering whether to amend the Trademark Act in 1988 pursuant to the
recommendations of the Trademark Review Commission of the United States Trademark
Association:
The United States Trademark Association proclaims itself "An Organization for
the Development and Protection of Trademarks." It is composed of companies
that are vitally interested in protecting their trademarks. Fifteen "regular"
members of the Review Commission were such companies; fourteen, from law
firms, were listed as "associate members." Of the fourteen, one, J. Thomas
McCarthy, is primarily a law teacher; but he is also described as "of counsel" to a
law firm. There was no one on the Commission who stands outside the
trademark-protecting community. I don't remotely question the devotion of the
Commission to the public interest-as they view it; but the whole operation was
unavoidably tilted toward stronger protection for trademark owners.
Trademark Law Revision Act: Hearings on H.R. 4156 Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. 101 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 House Hearings] (statement of Ralph S.
Brown).
165. As for the ethical consideration, the question is whether an attorney may
simultaneously represent two clients and argue for one that trade dress is not registrable,
while arguing for the other that it is. The American Bar Association Model Rules of
Professional Conduct state that "[a] lawyer shall not represent a client if the
representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to
another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests." MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.7(b) (1996). Although the Rules leave a lawyer some
room to take contrary positions for different clients on a legal issue, see id. Rule 1.7 cmt. 9,
there is obviously a limit to how well an attorney can argue that trade dress is not entitled
to principal register registration for one client, when the same attorney is seeking such
protection for her other clients.
166. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 771, 775 (1992). In ruling
against petitioner, the Court relied in part on petitioner's concessions "that it is possible
for a trade dress, even a restaurant trade dress, to be inherently distinctive," and "that
protecting an inherently distinctive trade dress from its inception may be critical to new
entrants to the market and that withholding protection until secondary meaning has been
established would be contrary to the goals of the Lanham Act." Id.
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the court, they are too easily dismissed as idiosyncratic or too often
barred by stare decisis.67
Third, establishing courts and juries as the gatekeepers of
competition is a dangerous path, not only because of the risk that they
may improperly foreclose a competitor's entry, but because of the
uncertainty and expense associated with obtaining their approval.
Some courts appear to assume that, so long as the case is eventually
resolved in favor of the defendant, this is sufficient to safeguard
consumer welfare." But few markets offer the prospect of such
lavish rents for later entrants that competitive entry will remain
attractive if it requires payment of a million-dollar litigation cover
charge. As the Department of Justice warned during the debates
leading to the adoption of the Trademark Act, the mere recognition
of a colorable legal claim will often prove sufficient to discourage
competitive entry."9
B. Why Words and Symbols Deserve Protection as Trademarks, While
Trade Dress Does Not
Extending this analysis of benefits and costs more generally
suggests both the legitimacy and desirability of distinguishing
167. See iL at 783-84 (Stevens, J., concurring) (finding result justified, although not
supported by text of statute, because of stare decisis); United States v. Hon, 904 F.2d 803,
805-08 & n.2 (2d Cir. 1990) (rejecting Hon's argument that Congress in legislative history
accompanying 1962 amendments to infringement standard stated that it intended a very
limited change in the infringement standard, and interpreting the change as radically
expanding the infringement standard to encompass confusion of any sort because other
courts had already done so); Chevron Chemical Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc.,
659 F.2d 695, 701-02 (5th Cir. 1981) (recognizing that Congress probably did not intend a
broad unfair competition action when it enacted section 43(a), but nevertheless so
interpreting the statute because other courts had already done so).
168. See, e.g., Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 551 (5th Cir. 1998)
(implicitly suggesting that there were no anticompetitive consequences of allowing
plaintiffs to pursue claims that golf course hole layouts were trade dress because
defendant eventually prevailed).
169. See 1944 Trademark Hearings, supra note 47, at 71-72 (statement of Mr. Moyer,
Department of Justice) ("[T]he possibility that a competitor will be faced with a lawsuit or
litigation.., is sufficient, particularly if the competitor is a small man, to keep him out of
the field."); id. at 97 ("I again wish to emphasize that the right of a dominant company to
maintain a lawsuit, or to find colorable sanctions for monopoly or restraint of trade, as
demonstrated in the patent field, which has not yet been clarified and has been in litigation
for over 100 years, opens the door to all the evils of an express legal sanction. The mere
fact that a sanction is colorable and requires or invites litigation is sufficient to maintain
monopoly or restraint through the long course of private litigation or public litigation in
the courts."); see also Eveready Battery Co. v. Adolf Coors Co., 765 F. Supp. 440,444,448,
452 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (ruling that Coors may televise advertisement parodying the Energizer
bunny, but delays and potential legal exposure associated with advertisement led Coors
not to run advertisement).
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between trademark protection for: (1) words and symbols; (2)
packaging and labels claimed as trade dress ("true trade dress"); and
(3) product features claimed as trade dress. As the above analysis
suggests, trademark protection and unfair competition more generally
serve the public interest when they appropriately balance the benefits
of protection against its costs. The benefits of protection flow from
improving consumers' ability to identify readily their desired product;
its costs flow from increasing competitors' costs, reducing consumers'
ability to recognize competing products as competing, and restricting
consumer choice.' Protection must therefore balance consumers'
interest in avoiding confusion against consumers' interest in
competition." Both for individual marks and for categories of marks,
this balance turns on the claimed mark's value as a source of
information regarding the product ("trademark value") set against
the claimed mark's value as a product ("inherent product value")."v
Applying this balance to the three categories of potential
trademark subject matter establishes a clear hierarchy. At the top
and most readily justified as trademark subject matter, words and
symbols attached to products typically serve no purpose other than an
informational one and are the type of designation for which
170. See Ralph H. Folsom & Larry L. Teply, Trademarked Generic Words, 89 YALE
LJ. 1323, 1334-37, 1345, 1353 (1980); Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The
Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PiT. L. REV. 789,
851-63 (1997) (suggesting a similar competitive balance and arguing that dilution
protection upsets it); Lunney, supra note 1, at 433-37.
171. The legislative history accompanying the Trademark Act also referred to a desire
to protect the goodwill of a trademark owner. See S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 3-5 (2d Sess.
1946). But given that Congress emphasized in the same report the need to promote
competition and the role of trademarks in promoting such competition, see iL at 4,
Congress presumably did not intend to protect a trademark owner's goodwill or
reputation at the expense of competition or where the consumer interest in competition
outweighed the interest in protection. See Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun
Group, 611 F.2d 296, 300-01 (9th Cir. 1979) ("[T]rademark policies are designed (1) to
protect consumers from being misled ... ; (2) to prevent an impairment of the value of the
enterprise which owns the trademark; and (3) to achieve these ends in a manner consistent
with the objectives of free competition.").
172. As I have explained elsewhere, a mark's informational value depends on: (1)
whether it conveys otherwise unobservable information regarding the product; (2) the
value of that information in terms of its materiality to purchasing decisions; and (3) the
availability or ability to develop alternative means to convey that information. See
Lunney, supra note 1, at 435. A mark's product value depends on: (1) the extent to which
some consumers desire the mark for its own sake, rather than for any information it may
convey; (2) the expense entailed in developing an alternative design that consumers will
recognize and accept as a substitute for the original; and (3) the extent to which consumers
will consider the alternative designs available as imperfect substitutes for the original. See
id. at 434-35.
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alternatives are most readily available. In the middle, true trade dress
often serves an informational role, but also serves other functions,
such as presenting the product in an attractive and attention-getting
fashion. Alternative packaging is often available, but alternatives
may entail some expense to develop and the selection and design of
packaging may be constrained by practical manufacturing, shipping,
and marketing considerations." At the bottom, product features are
usually seen as an aspect of the product itself rather than a source of
information about the product, and consumers rarely rely on features
to identify a product's source, particularly where the product is
otherwise properly labeled. Alternative designs for the product itself
may be available, but are likely to prove substantially more expensive
than simple imitation ' and consumers are less likely to recognize and
accept the proffered alternative as a substitute for the original.
The results of this balancing for the three categories of potential
trademark subject matter are summarized in Table 1.
173. See, e.g., Aromatique, Inc. v. Gold Seal, Inc., 28 F.3d 863, 874 (8th Cir. 1994)
(noting that the packaging of a product played an important role in its commercial
success).
174. Some may argue that extending trademark protection is desirable because it
prohibits imitation and thereby creates an incentive for variation that may lead to
products that more precisely satisfy consumer desires. I have explained the flaw in this
suggestion elsewhere. See Lunney, supra note 1, at 439-69. The key question is whether
consumers prefer more variety at a higher price or a lower price with more uniformity.
Although consumers likely prefer some variety, legally-mandated variety is not likely to
promote consumer welfare. See also CHAMBERLIN, supra note 154, at 273; Pagliero v.
Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 344 (9th Cir. 1952) ("The law encourages competition
not only in creativeness but in economy of manufacture and distribution as well.").
Table 1. The Hierarchy of Protection


































be available, but likely
to be costly and prove
imperfect as substitutes
A careful policy analysis, thus, suggests the need to distinguish
between the protection accorded word and symbol marks; the
protection accorded product packaging and labels; and the protection
accorded product features. Although there may be exceptional cases
within each category," general rules should be tailored for typical
cases. And the typical case within each category is different enough
from the typical case for each of the other categories that the general
rules for protecting each category of claimed marks should differ.
175. Part of the reason the Court goes astray in both Two Pesos and Qualitex Co. is by
recognizing that there may be exceptional cases where extending protection is warranted
and would impose no costs, and then designing general legal rules for trade dress to fit
such exceptional cases. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162-66
(1995); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763,774-75 (1992).
[Vol. 51HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
August 2000] TRADE DRESS EMPEROR'S NEW CLOTHES
At the time Congress enacted the Trademark Act of 1946, the
common law had long-recognized these differences between word
and symbol marks, true trade dress, and product features, and varied
the protection available accordingly. Words and symbols received
protection most readily and most extensively as technical trademarks,
with recognized exceptions for generic and descriptive words.
Product packaging as well as descriptive words received protection
less readily. They could not qualify as technical trademarks7 6 but
could receive protection under the doctrine of unfair competition,
where the plaintiff could prove the misleading effect of the
defendant's imitation on consumers."7  Product features received
essentially no protection under trademark and unfair competition
law. They could not qualify as technical trademarks and could
176. See, e.g., Philadelphia Novelty Mfg. Co. v. Rouss, 40 F. 585, 587 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1889) ("[I]n ordinary circumstances, the adoption of packages of peculiar form and color
alone, unaccompanied by any distinguishing symbol, letter, sign, or seal, is not sufficient to
constitute a trade-mark."); California Fig Syrup Co. v. Stearns, 67 F. 1008, 1011 (C.C.E.D.
Mich. 1895) (rejecting claim to "Syrup of Fig" as trademark on grounds that words were
descriptive of product).
177. See, e.g., Elgin Nat. Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U.S. 665, 674 (1901)
("If a plaintiff has the absolute right to the use of a particular word or words as a trade
mark, then if an infringement is shown, the wrongful or fraudulent intent is presumed ....
But where an alleged trade mark is not in itself a good trade mark, yet the use of the word
has come to denote the particular manufacturer or vendor.... such circumstances must be
made out as will show wrongful intent in fact, or justify that inference from the inevitable
consequences of the act complained of."); Kellogg Toasted Corn Flake Co. v. Quaker
Oats Co., 235 F. 657, 664 (6th Cir. 1916) ("If the words in issue in the instant case
constituted a technical trade-mark, use by others of the mark would be presumed to be
made with wrongful intent and so would be enjoined. This, however, is not the rule in
respect of the use by others of descriptive words which have acquired such secondary
significance as is here urged."); Samson Cordage Works v. Puritan Cordage Mills, 211 F.
603, 608 (6th Cir. 1914) ("An important respect in which the action for infringement of
trade-mark differs from that for unfair competition is that in the former the wrongful
intent is presumed from the fact of infringement, while in the latter recovery can be had
only on proof of wrongful intent in fact ... ."); John T. Dyer Quarry Co. v. Schuylkill
Stone Co., 185 F. 557, 563 (C.C.D.N.J. 1911) (recognizing the distinction "between the
infringement of a trade-mark proper, which, as a violation of an exclusive right of
property, need not involve fraud or wrongful intent, and such wrongful and fraudulent
simulation of mere trade-names, description, dress or package as under the circumstances
of a given case amounts only to unfair competition in trade in contradistinction to trade-
mark infringement"); Church & Dwight Co. v. Russ, 99 F. 276, 279 (C.C.D. Ind. 1900)
("[W]hile the idea of fraud or imposition lies at the foundation of the law of technical
trade-marks as well as the law of unfair competition, it must be borne in mind that fraud
may rest in actual intent shown by the evidence, or may be inferred from the
circumstances, or may be conclusively presumed from the act itself. In the case of unfair
competition, the fraudulent intent must be shown by the evidence, or be inferable from
the circumstances, while, in the case of the use by one trader of the trade-mark or trade-
symbol of a rival trader, fraud will be presumed from its wrongful use."); see also
Derenberg, supra note 36, at 834-35.
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receive protection under the doctrine of unfair competition only in
those exceptional cases where a defendant was otherwise passing off
her product as that of the plaintiff."8 Even in the exceptional cases,
relief was usually limited to a requirement of proper labeling."9
As discussed above, Congress intended to retain this disparate
treatment when it adopted the Trademark Act of 1946. Although it
broadened the category of technical trademarks to include descriptive
words,"S it expressly excluded product packaging, labels, and product
178. See Warner & Co. v. Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526, 531-33 (1924) ("The petitioner or
anyone else is at liberty under the law to manufacture and market an exactly similar
preparation... [, b]ut the imitator of another's goods must sell them as his own
production."); Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 120-22 (1938);
Feathercombs, Inc. v. Solo Prods. Corp., 306 F.2d 251, 257 (2d Cir. 1962); Modem Aids,
Inc. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 264 F.2d 93, 94 (2d Cir. 1959) (per curiam) ("Even [where a
plaintiff is entitled to relief under unfair competition against an imitator], however, the
relief would go no further than to require the defendant to make plain to buyers that the
plaintiff was not the source of the machines sold by it."); Paramount Indus., Inc. v. Solar
Prods. Corp., 186 F.2d 999, 1001-02 (2d Cir. 1951); Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. Frances
Denney, Inc., 99 F.2d 272, 273 (3d Cir. 1938) (per curiam); Vogue Ring Creations, Inc. v.
Hardman, 410 F. Supp. 609, 613 (D.R.I. 1976) ("It is well established that copying
another's article is not, standing alone, unfair competition. It must be shown that the
defendant so confusingly presented his product through packaging, labeling or otherwise
as to lead purchasers to believe that they were buying the plaintiff's article."); Remco
Indus., Inc. v. Toyonmeka, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 948, 952, 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Key West
Hand Print Fabrics, Inc. v. Serbin, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 287, 292 (S.D. Fla. 1965). For other
differences, see Milton Handler & Charles Pickett, Trade Marks and Trade Names-An
Analysis and Synthesis, 30 COLUM. L. REv. 168, 168-201 (1930) (describing greater
requirements for and narrower scope of protection for trade names under doctrine of
unfair competition as compared to protection of and for trademarks).
179. See, e.g., Warner & Co., 265 U.S. at 532-33 (injunction may properly prohibit
defendant and its agents from suggesting to its customers the feasibility of substituting its
product for that of the plaintiff, and may even require the defendant to attach a label to its
products stating that its product is not to be sold or dispensed in response to a request for
the plaintiff's product, but a prohibition on the use of the product feature at issue,
chocolate, "goes too far" and was improper); Bose Corp. v. Linear Design Labs., Inc., 467
F.2d 304, 309-10 (2d Cir. 1972) (finding no unfair competition despite similarity between
original and imitator given that defendant had plainly labeled its product as its own);
Modem Aids, Inc. v. R. H. Macy & Co., 264 F.2d 93, 94 (2d Cir. 1959) (per curiam)
(noting that even if plaintiff can show consumer deception as a result of defendant's
imitation, relief is limited to requirement of proper labeling); West Point Mfg. Co. v.
Detroit Stamping Co., 222 F.2d 581, 588, 589, 596-97 (6th Cir. 1955) (noting that "the only
obligation on the copier is to avoid misleading the public into the belief that the article is
manufactured by the prior patent owner; and that, in carrying out its obligation to avoid so
misleading, it inform the public unmistakably that it is the product of the one making such
copy"); J.C. Penney Co. v. H.D. Lee Mercantile Co., 120 F.2d 949, 955, 958 (8th Cir. 1941)
(ruling that "[1]abeling is the usual and accepted method of distinguishing the goods of one
manufacturer from those of another in the market" and limiting relief to requirement of
proper labeling and accuracy in statements made concerning defendant's products).
180. At the same time, Congress offset the expansion in protection for descriptive
marks inherent in this recognition by incorporating a fair use defense in section 33(b)(4) of
[Vol. 51
August 2000] TRADE DRESS EMPEROR'S NEW CLOTHES 1181
shapes and designs from the definition of trademarks eligible for
registration on the principal register. Analysis of the Trademark
Act's central policies confirms that it was entirely sensible for
Congress to decide to limit the benefits of the principal register to
word and symbol marks. Although providing consumers with a
means to identify a particular product is desirable, making protection
available too readily for all potential source-identifiers would carry
too high a price for consumers and the competitive process."
Recognizing that trade-off, Congress chose to reserve principal
register trademark status for the least costly means of identifying and
distinguishing products-word and symbol marks."8
IV. Is It Too Late to Correct Leeds' Mistake?
Unsupported by the plain language, the legislative history, or the
policies of the Trademark Act, those who seek to preserve Leeds'
mistake can argue only that too much time has passed to permit
correction of this mistake.1" However, time alone, as the Court's
the Act. See Trademark Act of 1946, ch. 540, § 33(b)(4), 60 Stat. 427, 438 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (1999)).
181. See CHAMBERLIN, supra note 154, at 272 ("Legal cases and text books agree that
the function of a trade-mark is to show origin, to identify. The question is, where does
identification leave off and differentiation begin? There would be mere identification,
without further differentiation of product, in the case of two competing goods, identical in
every respect, - as to color, shape and design, labels, marks and names, everything
excepting only an inconspicuous identification mark or the name and address of the
producer.").
182. As discussed, the Department of Justice opposed the trademark bill as potentially
anticompetitive. See 1944 Trademark Hearings, supra note 47, at 58-74; 1942 Trademark
Hearings, supra note 65, at 23-34, 39-53. That Congress found these concerns persuasive is
reflected in Congress's decision to rewrite key aspects of the bill, including the definition
of "trademark" for purposes of the principal register to track the common law's definition
of a technical trademark. See supra text accompanying notes 65-68. Other key changes
include the following. The cancellation section, section 14, was rewritten to allow
cancellation of generic marks and improperly used certification marks. Compare H.R. 82,
78th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 14 (1943), with Act of July 5, 1946, § 14, 60 Stat. 433 (1946). A
genericness exception was added to the defensive incontestability provision in section 15.
Compare H.R. 82, supra, § 15, with Act of July 5, 1946, § 15(4), 60 Stat. 434 (1946).
Section 32(3), which allowed the trademark owner to control the resale of reconditioned
and second-hand goods was deleted. Compare H.R. 82, supra, § 32(3), with Act of July 5,
1946, § 32, 60 Stat. 438 (1946). Section 33(b), the affirmative incontestability provision,
was rewritten to incorporate a generic-ness defense in the preamble, compare H.R. 82,
supra, § 33(b), with Act of July 5, 1946, § 33(b), 60 Stat. 438 (1946); to broaden the defense
for improper joint use, compare H.R. 82, supra, § 33(b)(3), with Act of July 5, 1946,
§ 33(b)(3), 60 Stat. 438 (1946); and to add a defense where "the mark has been or is being
used to violate the antitrust laws of the United States," compare H.R. 82, supra, § 32, with
Act of July 5,1946, § 33(b)(7), 60 Stat. 439 (1946).
183. Professor Paul Goldstein has reminded me that our signing of the Trade Related
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decision in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.'" demonstrates, does not
insulate an incorrect administrative interpretation of a statute from
judicial review. Nevertheless, given the time that has passed,
proponents of Leeds' misinterpretation can either assert that courts
should defer to the PTO's longstanding administrative interpretation
of the statute or rely on Congress's failure to overturn Leeds' mistake
as a basis for continuing it."8 Neither position has merit.
As to the administrative deference point, such an argument
almost completely misunderstands the PTO's role in the process
leading to the interpretation of the Trademark Act we have today.
Although the PTO, in the person of Ms. Leeds, initially recognized a
place for trade dress on the principal register,'" the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals has been the agent principally responsible for
maintaining and expanding the principal register status of trade dress.
On any number of occasions, the PTO has tried to limit the
registrability of trade dress only to see its decisions overturned by the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. For example, when the PTO,
in its expert judgment, refused to recognize the shape of a product as
a whole as a trademark, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
reversed.' 87 When the PTO perceived a potential conflict between
design patents and trademark protection and took steps to limit the
potential conflict, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
disagreed and removed the bars on trademark registration for
material protected by a design patent."n When the PTO excluded
Aspects of Intellectual Property (or TRIPS) may limit our ability to remove trade dress
from the principal register. Although arbitration panels of the World Trade Organization
will have responsibility for interpreting the provision, it does not appear that TRIPS
requires signatories to extend trademark protection to trade dress. The relevant provision
states: "Any sign, or any combination of signs, capable of distinguishing the goods or
services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings... shall be eligble for
registration as trademarks." Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, § 2, art. 15(1), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS- RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994). Article 15(1) further defines "signs" as
"including personal names, letters, figurative elements and compinations of colours as well
as any combination of such signs." Id TRIPS contains no express requirement of
trademark protection for trade dress.
184. 486 U.S. 281, 293-94 (1988) (striking down 50 year old administrative
interpretation of a statute on the basis that the interpretation was inconsistent with the
statute's plain language).
185. See Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632,635-36 (7th Cir. 1993).
186. See Exparte Haig & Haig Ltd., 118 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 229,231 (Comm'r Pat. 1958).
187. See In re Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 335 F.2d 836, 840 (C.C.P.A. 1964); In re
Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925,932 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
188. See In re Honeywell, Inc., 497 F.2d 1344,1347-49 (C.C.P.A.).
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material from the principal register as functional, the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals replaced the PTO's definition of
functionality with a far narrower one.1" Given this reality, the notion
of deference to the agency charged with administering the Act is
inapposite. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, not the PTO,
has effectively dictated the present scope of trade dress protection."
Moreover, the Court has repeatedly stated that deference to an
administrative agency's interpretation is appropriate under the
principles of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc."' only where the statute is ambiguous. If a court,
following the proper rules of statutory construction, finds the statute
unambiguous, then a contrary administrative interpretation may not
stand. '  As discussed, the statutory language reflects Congress's
conscious decision to exclude trade dress from the principal register."9
189. Compare In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1334-35 (C.C.P.A.
1982) (noting and rejecting PTO's interpretation of functionality), with In re Deister
Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 500 (C.C.P.A. 1961) ("A functional feature has been
defined in the Restatement of the Law of Torts, Section 742, as a feature of goods which
affects their purpose, action, or performance, or the facility or economy of processing,
handling or using them. The courts have accepted this definition and have also held
'functional' the shape, size, or form of an article which contributes to its utility, durability
or effectiveness or the ease with which it serves its function.").
190. See Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 651 (7th Cir. 1993) (Cudahy, J.,
dissenting).
191. 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984).
192. See i at 842 ("If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress."); see also City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 339
(1994) (refusing to defer to the administrative agency's interpretation of the statute where
Court finds statutory text unambiguous); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust
& Say. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 109 (1993); Public Employee Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S.
158, 171 (1989) ("[N]o deference is due to agency interpretations at odds with the plain
language of the statute itself. Even contemporaneous and longstanding agency
interpretations must fall to the extent they conflict with statutory language."); K Mart
Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988); Board of Governors, FRS v. Dimension
Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 368 (1986) ("The traditional deference courts pay to agency
interpretation is not to be applied to alter the clearly expressed intent of Congress.");
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,213-14 (1976) ("The rulemaking power granted
to an administrative agency charged with the administration of a federal statute is not the
power to make law. Rather, it is 'the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the
will of Congress as expressed by the statute."') (quoting Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S.
68,74 (1965)).
193. See supra text accompanying notes 15-68. The Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals and the Seventh Circuit have both noted that the Act defines a trademark to
"includef any word, name, symbol, or device," and have both identified the word
"include" in the definition as an ambiguity that would permit interpretation of the term
"trademark" to include trade dress. Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 635 (7th Cir.
1993); In re Kotzin, 276 F.2d 411, 414-15 (C.C.P.A. 1960). But this analysis overstates any
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Because the statute is unambiguous as to this point, courts may not
defer to a contrary administrative decision.'94
As for Congress's failure to reverse the recognition of trade dress
as principal register subject matter, Justice Frankfurter has cautioned:
"[W]e walk on quicksand when we try to find in the absence of
corrective legislation a controlling legal principle."'95  "Ordinarily,
ambiguity that may be present. When Congress took Upton's definition of a technical
trademark, it incorporated only four terms, "word, name, symbol, or device," where
Upton had used six, "name, symbol, figure, letter, form or device." UPTON, supra note 26,
at 2. As a result, even if the word "includes" signals that the subject-matter list
incorporated in the Trademark Act's definition of a "trademark" is not exclusive, still the
inclusion of only such subject matter as was recognized by the common law as technical
trademarks suggests that the list may be broadened, but only to additional subject matter
recognized as technical trademarks. See National Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105
F.3d 841, 846-47 (2d Cir. 1997) (refusing to recognize basketball game as a work of
authorship, despite the fact that statutory listing of works was "concededly non-exclusive,"
because basketball games are "neither similar nor analogous to any of the listed
categories" and because Congress was aware of the issue and expressly chose not to
recognize basketball games as a work of authorship). To read the list as open-ended and
as not imposing any constraint on the nature of trademark subject matter is to read the
language out of the Act. Such an interpretation would violate at least three of the four
canons of statutory construction previously identified. See supra text accompanying notes
17-21. It renders the language superfluous; it interprets the definition of a trademark as
identical to the definition of a mark, even though Congress specifically used different
language for the two definitions; and it reads the language Congress eventually adopted
for the definition of a trademark as identical to the language of the 1924 and 1938 bills that
Congress had specifically rejected. Cf John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 510 U.S. at 109
("By reading the words 'to the extent' to mean nothing more than 'if,' the Department has
exceeded the scope of the available the ambiguity."). Moreover, when Ms. Robert
testified to Congress following the revision of the trademark definition to incorporate the
"word, name, symbol, or device" language, she recognized the language as a limitation.
See 1944 Trademark Hearings, supra note 47, at 20 (statement of Daphne Robert)
("Trade-marks are symbols or names, words or devices which distinguish the products of
one manufacturer from the products of another manufacturer.") (emphasis added).
194. See National Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479,
503 (1998) (refusing to defer to the administrative agency's interpretation of the statute
where it is contrary to the relevant statute's plain language); Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S.
115, 122 (1994) ("A regnlation's age is no antidote to clear inconsistency with a statute,
and the fact, again, that [the regulation] flies against the plain language of the statutory
text exempts courts from any obligation to defer to it."); City of Chicago, 511 U.S. at 339
(refusing to defer to administrative agency's interpretation contrary to the relevant
statute's plain language); John Hancock Mut Life Ins. Co., 510 U.S. at 109 (same); Presley
v. Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491, 508-09 (1992) (same); Public Employee
Retirement Sys., 492 U.S. at 175 (same); K Mart Corp., 486 U.S. at 293-94 (striking 50 year
old administrative interpretation that Court found inconsistent with the statute's plain
language); Board of Governors, FRS, 474 U.S. at 368 (striking administrative
interpretation contrary to statute's plain language).
195. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 121 (1940); see also Central Bank v. First
Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 186 (1994); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S.
164, 175 n.1 (1989) ("It does not follow.., that Congress' failure to overturn a statutory
precedent is reason for this Court to adhere to it.").
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'Congress' silence is just that-silence."' '  The Court sometimes
recognizes an exception to that general rule where Congress reenacts
statutory language.1" However, given the risk that a formal
reenactment of existing law may have no more substantive meaning
than congressional silence, the Court has restricted the doctrine to
cases where "Congress exhibited both a detailed knowledge [of the
statutory provisions] and their judicial interpretation and a
willingness to depart from those provisions regarded as undesirable
or inappropriate for incorporation.""19 In an apparent attempt to take
advantage of this doctrine, representatives of trademark's propertied
class slipped a reenactment of the statutory definition of a trademark
into the 1988 amendment dealing with the intent-to-use provisions
and added a sentence to the Senate Report that might be read to
recognize Leeds' mistake.'9 In 1995, the Qualitex Court picked up on
this and used it as partial justification for rejecting the hundred-year-
old rule prohibiting the recognition of color alone as a trademark. 200
However, the Qualitex Court's invocation of the reenactment
doctrine was inappropriate. As the first threshold condition for the
doctrine to apply, there must be a consistent judicial interpretation
prior to the reenactment.2' In applying the doctrine, the Qualitex
196. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 749 (1989) (quoting
Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678,686 (1987)).
197. Because Congress may not as carefully examine an issue when it simply reenacts
existing language, the Court has not always applied the reenactment doctrine. See, e.g.,
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 393-94 & n.24 (1977)
(Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting majority's refusal to apply
the reenactment doctrine despite its apparent applicability).
198. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575,580-81 (1978).
199. See Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667 § 134(3), 102 Stat.
3935, 3947 (1988); S. Rep. No. 100-515 at 44 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577,
5607 ("The revised definition intentionally retains... (iv) the words 'symbol or device' so
as not to preclude the registration of colors, shapes, sounds or configurations where they
function as trademarks.") (emphasis added).
200. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 172-73 (1995) ("Finally, when
Congress reenacted the terms 'word, name, symbol, or device' in 1988, it did so against a
legal background in which those terms had come to include color, and its statutory
revision embraced that understanding.").
201. See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 920-21 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) (rejecting
proposed interpretation of statute despite reenactment where Court found judicial
interpretation prior to reenactment somewhat inconsistent); Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510
U.S. 517, 527-32 (1994) (refusing to apply reenactment doctrine to interpret Copyright
Act's attorney's fees provision where Court found no settled "dual standard"
interpretation "about which Congress could have been aware"); Pierce v. Underwood, 487
U.S. 552, 567 (1988) (refusing to apply reenactment doctrine where only one circuit had
endorsed proposed interpretation); Jefferson County Pharm. Ass'n v. Abbott Labs., 460
U.S. 150, 168-69 (1983) (refusing to apply reenactment doctrine given lack of consistent
judicial interpretation of statute in manner for which party argued).
Court cited: (1) the Federal Circuit's ruling in 1985 that color alone
was registrable; (2) the PTO's adoption in 1986 of regulations that
permitted the registration of color alone; and (3) the Senate Report
implying approval of a broad interpretation of registrable subject
matter. ' The Court failed to note the hundred-year-old common law
rule rejecting color alone as a trademark or to cite the decisions
from other circuits that both were contemporaneous to the 1988
amendments and contrary to the Federal Circuit's ruling."' The
Court also failed to note that the PTO had for forty years, from 1946
until the decision in Owens-Corning, consistently maintained that
color alone was not eligible for registration as a trademark.' As the
Court held in Pierce v. Underwood, such inconsistency in a statute's
interpretation precludes application of the reenactment doctrine,
even where a Committee report purports to adopt the argued-for
interpretation?
202. Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 172.
203. See, e.g., Philadelphia Novelty Mfg. Co. v. Rouss, 40 F. 585, 587 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1889) ("[]n ordinary circumstances, the adoption of packages of peculiar form and color
alone, unaccompanied by any distinguishing symbol, letter, sign, or seal, is not sufficient to
constitute a trade-mark."); Fleischmann v. Starkey, 25 F. 127,128 (C.C.D.R.I. 1885) ("The
color of a label, apart from a name or device, can hardly be the subject-matter of a trade-
mark.").
204. See First Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378, 1382 (9th Cir. 1987)
(stating that "the general rule remains that an element of distinctiveness of shape in
combination with the color [must exist] before a trademark will be granted"); Association
of Co-op. Members, v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 684 F.2d 1134, 1140 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing
Quaabug Rubber Co. v. Fabiano Shoe Co., 567 F.2d 154, 161 (1st Cir. 1977) for the
proposition that "color alone cannot constitute valid trademark"); Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 204 n.6 (2d Cir. 1979)
("Although color alone is not capable of becoming a trademark, a combination of colors
together with a distinctive arbitrary design may serve as a trademark."); Quabaug, 567
F.2d at 164 ("[W]e agree with Fabiano that color alone cannot be appropriated as a
trademark ... ."); Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 85, 96 (S.D. Iowa 1982)
("'Color, per se, is not capable of appropriation as a trademark."') (quoting 1 J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 7:16 (1973)), affd, 721 F.2d
253 (8th Cir. 1983).
205. See, e.g., In re American Red Magen David for Israel, 222 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 266,267
n.4 (T.T.A.B. 1984) ("The Examining Attorney has argued that color alone or applied
indiscriminately to the overall configuration of a product cannot function as a trademark.
Under the theory of color depletion this has long been the maxim behind many decisions
of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board and the courts."); Genesco, Inc. v. Levi Strauss
& Co., 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1205, 1207 (T.T.A.B. 1983) ("'Color, per se, is not capable of
appropriation as a trademark."') (quoting MCCARTHY, supra note 204), affd, 742 F.2d
1401 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Shaw, 184 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 253,255 (T.T.A.B. 1974).
206. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 567 (1988) (rejecting application of
reenactment doctrine to support particular interpretation of statute where "the almost
uniform appellate interpretation (12 Circuits out of 13) contradicted the interpretation
endorsed in the Committee Report"). That proponents of broader trademark protection
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When we move from the issue of color specifically to the
question of trade dress more generally, a reenactment argument for
legitimizing Leeds' mistake suffers from similar flaws. By 1988, only
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Federal Circuit
had interpreted the principal register trademark definition to include
trade dress. Neither the Court nor the other circuits had expressly
addressed the trade dress registrability issue.2 7 Moreover, the Court's
decisions in Sears and Compco cast a considerable shadow over the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals' chosen path.m Although
neither Sears nor Compco addressed federal unfair competition
directly.' their analysis of the interference that state unfair
competition protection would create with the goals of the patent
system applies equally well to federal protection of product
configurations as trade dress."' Aside from the doctrinal distinction
had slipped a sentence into the Senate Report purporting to support a broader
interpretation would also not suffice. See City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense
Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 337 (1994) ("But it is the statute, and not the Committee Report,
which is the authoritative expression of the law .... ).
207. See Kohier Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 635 (7th Cir. 1993) (addressing as a
matter of initial impression for a circuit other than the Federal Circuit or the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals a challenge to the registration of a product configuration on
the principal register). A number of decisions had protected trade dress under section
43(a) of the Trademark Act, see, e.g., Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing
Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 701-02 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981), but those decisions cannot
fairly be read to address whether trade dress is eligible for registration on the principal
register as a trademark. After all, the common law had long protected trade dress under
unfair competition law, yet had also long excluded trade dress from protection as a
trademark. In addition, as the Court admitted in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros.,
Inc., 120 S. Ct. 1339, 1342-43 (2000), "courts have assumed, often without discussion," that
trade dress may receive protection under section 43(a). Where courts have followed a
particular interpretation without explaining it, the Court has held that the reenactment
doctrine does not apply because such practice may not come as readily to the attention of
Congress as an express interpretation. See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527-32
(1994) (refusing to apply reenactment doctrine where, despite longstanding practice of
interpreting statute in particular way, Court did not believe that Congress was aware of
the settled interpretation).
208. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238-39 (1964) (limiting
state law protection of product designs or configurations to requirement of proper
labeling); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232-33 (1964) (holding that
state may require proper labeling but may not prohibit the copying of the article itself
"when the article is unpatented and uncopyrighted").
209. They did not address protection for trade dress under section 43(a) because such
protection did not begin to become common until the mid-1970s. See 1 GILSON &
GILSON, supra note 3, § 2.14[1], at 2-165 (tracing beginnings of trade dress protection
under section 43(a) to dicta in Bose Corp. v. Linear Design Labs., Inc., 467 F.2d 304, 309
(2d Cir. 1972)).
210. See Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 113 F.3d 373, 379 (2d Cir.
1997) (noting that "the Lanham Act must be construed in the light of a strong federal
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of federal versus state law, the principal argument against applying
the reasoning of Sears and Compco to cases involving federal
protection of product configuration is that patent and trademark law
serve different purposes, one to encourage innovation, the other to
limit consumer confusion.21' But this argument fails to provide a basis
for distinguishing the reasoning of Sears and Compco, given that state
unfair competition law was also supposed to address the purpose of
remedying consumer confusion.
The "separate purposes" argument is equally unpersuasive on
the merits. As discussed, trade dress can receive protection today
without any showing that the dress serves a material, source-related
informational role.212 Although patent protection and trademark
protection are supposed to serve different purposes, the practice has
been otherwise. With the recognition of trade dress as a trademark,
trade dress infringement today may be found based upon the
imitation of a popular product alone."3 In addition, whatever
separation there might be between their formal purposes, the effect
of trade dress protection is often indistinguishable from that of patent
law. Both require competitors to work around the protection
provided, and doing so in either case takes time and resources, and
generates a less perfect substitute for the original. To that extent,
both forms of protection tend in identical fashion to reduce, but not
necessarily eliminate, competitive pressure on the protected party.214
policy in favor of vigorously competitive markets," and finding Sears and Compco
relevant even if their preemption analysis does not strictly apply to Lanham Act); Kohler
Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632,647 (7th Cir. 1993) (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
211. See Kohler Co., 12 F.3d at 643; In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 928
(C.C.P.A. 1964).
212. See supra text accompanying notes 123-138.
213. At this time, imitation is a basis for drawing inferences of secondary meaning and
likelihood of confusion, but a trier of fact may decide not to draw such inferences in
particular cases. See Coach Leatherware Co. v. AnnTaylor, Inc., 933 F.2d 162, 169 (2d Cir.
1991) (stating that inference of secondary meaning can be drawn from fact of imitation
alone); Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d 1176, 1183-84 & n.16 (7th Cir.
1989) (noting that imitation may be considered as a factor tending to prove secondary
meaning and likelihood of confusion, but emphasizing that it is not the sole factor);
Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 844 (9th Cir. 1987); Truck
Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210,1220 & n.13 (8th Cir. 1976) (stating that
inferences of secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion can be drawn from fact of
imitation alone); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 16 cmt. b
(1995).
214. In Kohler Co., the Seventh Circuit argued that trade dress protection creates no
"real" monopoly, because competitors are still free to introduce alternative designs. 12
F.3d at 643. The flaws in this argument as to functionality itself have been discussed
above, but it is also worth noting competitors are equally free to work around a patent in
order to offer a competing product. See, e.g., CHAMBERLIN, supra note 154, at 62 ("Are
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51
August 2000] TRADE DRESS EMPEROR'S NEW CLOTHES
As a result, even where a product configuration in fact serves an
informational role, extending trade dress protection to the
configuration also protects the configuration's inherent product value
without the configuration first satisfying the rigorous scrutiny and
high standards of invention required for a patent. Further, trade
dress protection increases the rewards from, and therefore the likely
investment in, a product's appearance, its packaging, and other
promotional efforts. 5 But more of one thing must mean less of
another."6 As increased trade protection makes expenditures on
product marketing relatively more attractive, it makes investments in
other areas, such as research and development, relatively less
attractive.217  At the margins, increasing trade dress protection will
tend to distract resources from the inventive efforts the patent system
seeks to encourage and will tend to promote differentiation at the
expense of innovation. Although both have value, today's more
there any bases, after all, for distinguishing between patents and trade-marks? Each
makes a product unique in certain respects; this is its monopolistic aspect. Each leaves
room for other commodities almost but not quite like it; this is its competitive aspect. The
differences between them are only in degree, and it is doubtful if a significant distinction
may be made even on this score.").
215. See Lunney, supra note 1, at 430-31; James M. Treece, Protectability of Product
Differentiation: Is and Ought Compared, 18 RUTGERS L. REv. 1019, 1021-22 (1964); see
also Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J.
224 (1967) (articulating need to recognize resources wasted seeking the rents available
from monopolies as one of the social welfare losses generated by monopoly); Arnold
Plant, The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Inventions, 1 ECONOMICA 30 (n.s.
1934) (arguing that the availability of rents from patent protection may lead to investment
of excessive resources seeking the available rents).
216. See JOAN ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION 104 (1933);
SUBCOMMITEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF SENATE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM. 45-46
(Comm. Print 1958) ("It is easy to conceive of the possibility that such allocation [of
productive resources to research and development] is too meager. But can there ever be
too much? Is not more research and development always better than less? Is it possible
that too much is devoted to the inventive effort of the Nation? This depends on what it is
that is curtailed when inventive activity is expanded. More of one thing must mean less of
another, and the question is, what it is of which there will be less.... Whenever permanent
economic policies-not just war or depression measures-are discussed, sound economics
must start from the principle that no activity can be promoted without encroaching on
some other activity. More of one service or product must mean less of another.").
217. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49
VAND. L. REV. 483, 582-601 (1996) (explaining how increasing intellectual property
protection to encourage one activity will necessarily draw resources from other creative
activities); see also BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 75 (2d ed.
1967) (recognizing similar risk from too much copyright); Robert M. Hurt & Robert M.
Schuchman, The Economic Rationale of Copyright, 56 AM. ECON. REV. 421, 425, 430
(1966) (same); Arnold Plant, The Economic Aspects of Copyright in Books, 1
ECONOMICA 167,170 (n.s. 1934) (same).
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expansive trade dress protection creates a variance between social
and private cost and between social and private value that will likely
lead to over-investment in differentiation. As a result, the concerns
expressed in Sears and Compco continue to suggest that only limited
protection should be available for trade dress under the Trademark
Act, and a number of courts have so recognized.218 Under these
circumstances, the judicial track record on the registration of trade
dress on the principal register in 1988 lacked "the unbroken chain of
judicial decisions" required to apply the reenactment doctrine.219
In addition, the Court has also typically required, as a second
threshold condition before applying the reenactment doctrine, that
Congress exhibit detailed knowledge of the provision at issue and its
judicial interpretation so that congressional intent to resolve the issue
may reasonably be inferred. ° Where there is reason to doubt that
Congress was aware of the specific issue or the judicial interpretations
on point, no presumption arises that Congress intended to resolve the
218. See Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 113 F.3d 373, 379 (2d Cir.
1997); Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 648-51 (7th Cir. 1993) (Cudahy, J.,
dissenting); Riback Enters., Inc. v. Denham, 452 F.2d 845, 847-49 (2d Cir. 1971); In re
Shenango Ceramics, Inc., 362 F.2d 287, 290 n.7 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (noting that concurring
member believed that Sears and Compco require prohibition on registration as a
trademark of any product feature covered by an expired utility patent); see also Bonito
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 152-57 (1989) (re-affirming validity
of Sears and Compco).
219. Jefferson County Pharm. Ass'n v. Abbott Labs, 460 U.S. 150, 168 (1983); see also
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 700-01 (1992) (applying reenactment doctrine to
control interpretation of language in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when Congress
incorporated language from prior statutes given "the Court's nearly century-long
interpretation of the prior statutes"); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 381 (1982) (applying the reenactment doctrine to construe statute
where there was an "absence of any dispute about the" existence of an implied cause of
action at the time of the reenactment).
220. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 456 U.S. at 381 (applying
reenactment doctrine where Congress as part of "a comprehensive reexamination and
significant amendment" of the Commodity Exchange Act left intact the language under
which the courts had implied a private cause of action); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581
(1978) (applying reenactment doctrine where "Congress exhibited both a detailed
knowledge of the FLSA provisions and their judicial interpretations and a willingness to
depart from those provisions regarded as undesirable or inappropriate for
incorporation"); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1975) (applying
doctrine where House initially proposed different language, but Senate wanted to retain
existing language and specifically cited decisions interpreting the existing language, and
Congress chose to retain existing language); see also 2B NORMAN J. SINGER,
SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 49.10 (5th ed. 1992) (noting that ratification
by appropriation is not favored and will not be accepted where prior knowledge of the
specific disputed action cannot be demonstrated clearly) (quoting D.C. Fed'n of Civic
Ass'ns, Inc. v. Airis, 391 F.2d 478,482 (D.C. Cir. 1968)).
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issue when it reenacts a provision." Using the reenactment doctrine
in such cases would therefore be inappropriate, particularly if
applying the exception would lead to an interpretation contrary to the
plain language of the statute.22
When we turn to the 1988 amendment to the Trademark Act,
there is little reason to suppose that Congress believed itself to be
resolving the issue of whether trade dress was registrable subject
matter in enacting the amendment. The amendment process focused
on the addition of intent to use as a basis for applying for trademark
registration.' During the hearings on the bill, there was no
discussion of the reenactment of the trademark definition, nor of
Leeds' mistake, nor of the question of trade dress's eligibility for
registration.' Although the Senate Report included one sentence
that addressed the issue, the sentence states only that "[t]he revised
221. See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527-32 (1994) (refusing to apply
reenactment doctrine where, despite longstanding practice of interpreting statute in
particular way, Court did not believe that Congress was aware of the settled
interpretation); Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 121 (1994) (refusing to apply
reenactment doctrine where "there is no ... evidence to suggest that Congress was even
aware of the VA's interpretive position"); Lever Bros. Co. v. United States, 877 F.2d 101,
106 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (refusing to apply reenactment doctrine despite established
administrative interpretation expressly affirmed in one sentence of legislative history on
the basis that court could "find no indication that a single member of Congress, much less
the committee, much less members speaking on the floor of either house, ever excavated
these paragraphs from the mass in which they lay embedded"); see also SINGER, supra
note 220, § 49.09, at 69 ("[The reenactment rule] does not apply where nothing indicates
that the legislature had its attention directed to the administrative interpretation upon
reenactment.").
222. See SINGER, supra note 220, § 49.09, at 69; see also Brown, 513 U.S. at 121 ("There
is an obvious trump to the reenactment argument, however, in the rule that '[w]here the
law is plain, subsequent reenactment does not constitute an adoption of a previous
administrative construction."') (quoting Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 190
(1991)); Massachusetts Trustees of E. Gas & Fuel Assocs. v. United States, 377 U.S. 235,
241-42 (1964) (holding that congressional reenactment has no interpretive effect where
regulations clearly contradict requirements of statute).
223. Amending the trademark definition was necessary to implement the intent-to-use
provisions, and thus the only change to the trademark definition was the addition of
language specifying that something could qualify as a trademark if "used by a person, or
which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce." Trademark Law Revision
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667 § 134, 102 Stat. 3935, 3947 (emphasis added to identify
language added by amendment); see also 1988 House Hearings, supra note 164, at 76
(statement of the United States Trademark Association) (noting that trademark definition
was primarily revised "to conform it to the proposed intent-to-use application system").
224. See 1988 House Hearings, supra note 164, at 76 (statement of the United States
Trademark Association) (stating that the revised trademark definition "does not alter...
the subject matter which has historically qualified as a trademark or service mark" without
mentioning Leeds' mistake, the trade dress issue, or the time period identified as
"historically").
definition intentionally retains ... (iv) the words 'symbol or device' so
as not to preclude the registration of colors, shapes, sounds or
configurations where they function as trademarks.""" Rather than
choosing an affirmative statement ("so as to include") that would
suggest that Congress intended to resolve the issue, the Senate
Report chose a negative phrasing ("so as not to preclude"). This
choice suggests that Congress was neither foreclosing nor requiring
the registration of such material.n's Moreover, as part of the 1988
amendment, Congress also rewrote parts of section 23, dealing with
supplemental register marks, yet retained the different definitions
of marks for the supplemental register and trademarks for the
principal register. Congress therefore left in place the plain language
of the statute that differentiates the protection available to trade
dress and the protection available to trademarks. In the face of the
Act's plain language that Congress expressly retained, it would be
inappropriate to apply the reenactment doctrine to read the 1988
amendment as requiring a continued place for trade dress on the
principal register.'
If there were room for doubt on this issue, Congress directly
considered in 1998 whether to recognize expressly a place for trade
dress on the principal register. 9  Although Congress chose to
225. S. Rep. No. 100-515, supra note 199, at 44 (emphasis added).
226. Cf. Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins., 508 U.S. 286, 293-94 (1993)
(stating that in dealing with similar negative language in amendments addressing aspects
of liability under section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1954, "[w]e infer
from these references an acknowledgment of the 10b-5 action without any further
expression of legislative intent to define it").
227. See Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667 § 121, 102 Stat.
3935,3942-43.
228. See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527-33 (1994) (refusing to apply
reenactment doctrine where it would result in interpretation contrary to the plain
language of the statute); Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 566-67 (1988) ("If this
language [in a House Report regarding the proper meaning of a statute] is to be
controlling upon us, it must be either (1) an authoritative interpretation of what the 1980
statute meant, or (2) an authoritative expression of what the 1985 Congress intended. It
cannot, of course, be the former, since it is the function of the courts and not the
Legislature, much less a Committee of one House of the Legislature,... to say what an
enacted statute means. Nor can it reasonably be thought to be the latter-because it is not
an explanation of any language that the 1985 Committee drafted, because on its face it
accepts the 1980 meaning of the terms as subsisting, and because there is no indication
whatever in the text or even the legislative history of the 1985 reenactment that Congress
thought it was doing anything insofar as the present issue is concerned except reenacting
and making permanent the 1980 legislation.").
229. See H.R. 3163, 105th Cong. § 2(a)(3) (1998) (proposing to add section (g) to
section 2 of the Trademark Act that would expressly authorize the registration of trade
dress on the principal register).
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recognize some such protection under section 43(a) as a form of
unfair competition,' it refused to adopt proposed section 2(g) that
would have expressly authorized the registration of trade dress on the
principal register. 1 In the House hearings regarding the trade dress
provisions, witnesses opposed the express recognition of trade dress
protection on the principal register and urged Congress to leave the
matter for the courts to resolve. 2 The fact that Congress followed
this advice and expressly omitted the trade dress principal register
provision confirms that Congress has not resolved the issue and has
left the courts free to reconsider their mistaken path.
Applying the reenactment doctrine would be inappropriate for
another reason as well. Because of Leeds' mistake, courts expanded
trade dress purporting to believe, and undoubtedly believing in some
cases, that Congress had already resolved the desirability of such
expansion. As a result, the judicial expansion of trade dress
protection occurred without the hard look usually associated with
230. See Trademark Law Treaty Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 105-330
§§ 201(a)(2)(A)(ii), 201(a)(4), 201(a)(5) & 201(a)(9), 112 Stat. 3064, 3069-70 (West Supp.
1999) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(3)). Curiously, the Court relied on
Congress's recognition of trade dress under section 43(a) as backhanded proof that
Congress had also approved the recognition of trade dress as subject matter eligible for
the principal register. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 120 S. Ct. 1339,
1342-43 (2000).
231. Compare H.R. 3163, 105th Cong. § 2(a)(3) (1998) (proposing to add section (g) to
section 2 of the Trademark Act that would expressly authorize the registration of trade
dress on the principal register), with Treaty Implementation Act § 201, 112 Stat. at 3069-70
(omitting proposed section 2(g)). In a departure from the ordinary rules regarding
congressional silence, the Court has held that where an interest group introduces
legislation seeking to amend a statute to reflect its desired interpretation, and that
legislation is defeated, a contrary interpretation of the statute is appropriate. See Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 685 (1954) (interpreting the Natural Gas Act to
encompass regulation of prices for wellhead sales of natural gas because "[a]ttempts to
weaken this protection by amendatory legislation.., have repeatedly failed"); see also M.
ELIZABETH SANDERS, THE REGULATION OF NATURAL GAS 52-57 (1981) (recounting
history behind ruling).
232. For example, the International Trademark Association ("INTA") opposed the
Trade Dress Bill for fear that congressional action might lead to improper protection and
reduce the flexibility of the courts in resolving trade dress issues appropriately. See Trade
Dress Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 3163 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and
Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 2 (1998)
(<http://www.house.gov/judiciary/41152.htm>) (testimony of David Stimson, President,
INTA) ("[(1)] The Lanham Act and developing case law must remain open-minded and
progressive in view of changing technology and the unanticipated consequences which
may result from rigidity in the law. (2) Trade dress legislation at this time may
unintentionally curtail existing protections or expand protection into those areas for which
courts have traditionally provided narrow scopes of protection.").
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such judicial activism.' Although Congress has not repealed the
expansion, it has not carefully examined its merits either, simply
deferring so far to the judiciary. The net result of this reciprocal
deference is radically expanded trade dress protection without a
careful examination by either Congress or the courts of the
expansion's merits.
Under these circumstances, time alone should not and does not
insulate Leeds' mistake from correction by Congress, the PTO, or the
courts. That Congress has the authority to undo Leeds' mistake is
undoubted, but may prove difficult to achieve given that the mistake
benefits a concentrated interest group, trademark owners, at the
expense of a dispersed group, consumers generally. In such conflicts,
the concentrated group enjoys a decided advantage because of the
lower transaction costs it faces to organize and lobby for its
position.' The PTO also has the authority to correct Leeds' mistake.
Even if the Senate Report's "so as not to preclude" language is
treated as a binding interpretation of the Trademark Act, still that
statement does not expressly require the recognition of trade dress as
principal register subject matter. At most, it allows for the possibility
of such registration. Under Chevron U.S.A., Inc., so long as Congress
has not required a place on the principal register for trade dress, the
PTO has the discretion to refuse it."s As for the courts, over the past
233. As Justice Brandeis warned in his dissent in International News Service v.
Associated Press:
But with the increasing complexity of society, the public interest tends to become
omnipresent; and the problems presented by new demands for justice cease to be
simple. Then the creation or recognition by courts of a new private right may
work serious injury to the general public, unless the boundaries of the right are
definitely established and wisely guarded.
248 U.S. 215, 262-63 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Musick, Peeler & Garrett v.
Employers Ins., 508 U.S. 286,291 (1993) ("[T]he creation of new rights ought to be left to
legislatures, not courts.").
234. On the transaction costs advantage of concentrated interest groups, see generally
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECrIvE ACTION: PUBLIc GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS (Harvard Economic Studies Vol. CXXIV, 1965); THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF RENT-SEEKING (Charles K. Rawley et al. eds., Topics in Regulatory
Economics and Policy, 1988).
235. See Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996) (holding that change in
administrative interpretation of statute remains entitled to Chevron deference so long as
the new interpretation remains a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statutory
provision); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 186-87 (1991) (ruling that even a sharp break
with a longstanding administrative interpretation entitled to deference). In Kohler Co. v.
Moen Inc., the Seventh Circuit approved the recognition of trade dress as principal
register subject matter on the grounds that such recognition was within the Chevron
discretion of the agency charged with administering the statute. 12 F.3d 632, 636 (7th Cir.
1993). Such discretion exists only where the statute is ambiguous. See, e.g., Chevron
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forty years, they have radically expanded trade dress protection in the
face of Congress's plain instructions otherwise. It would be curious,
indeed, if courts, having made trade dress protection into a threat to
consumer welfare, now pretended that Congress's non-instruction in
the 1988 amendment tied their hands.
V. The Wal-Mart Stores, Ina Decision: Two Steps Forward,
One Step Back
On March 22, 2000, the Court issued its decision in Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc. 6 In its decision, the Court reversed
the Second Circuit and held that product designs claimed as trade
dress could not qualify as inherently distinctive.' Rather, to receive
protection for such designs under section 43(a), a plaintiff must
demonstrate the existence of secondary meaning.' In so ruling, the
Court took two major steps forward in ensuring that trade dress
protection serves consumer welfare, rather than as a form of
corporate welfare.
First, in justifying its ruling, the Court adopted a more realistic
view of the policy concerns and the costs implicated by readily
available trade dress protection. Specifically, the Court recognized:
(1) That product design plays a substantial role in the value of the
product itself and courts must be careful to restrict trade dress
protection to cases where a plaintiff has proven that the feature
claimed as trade dress has real value to consumers as a source
identifier; 9
(2) That allowing protection of product features as inherently
distinctive trade dress creates an anticompetitive risk not fully
addressed by the functionality doctrine;m
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984). If
the statute is ambiguous, then the administrative agency may adopt either interpretation if
reasonable. See id. at 842.
236. 120 S. Ct. 1339 (2000).
237. See id at 1344 ("It seems to us that design, like color, is not inherently
distinctive.").
238. See id at 1346 ("We hold that, in an action for infringement of unregistered trade
dress under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, a product's design is distinctive, and therefore
protectible, only upon a showing of secondary meaning.").
239. Compare id. at 1344-45 (recognizing that primary role of product features is as part
of the product, rather than as information about the product), with Lunney, supra note 1,
at 371, 387-91, 433-39, 479-84 (emphasizing need to distinguish between legitimate
deception-based protection where mark is protected as a source of information concerning
a product and illegitimate property-based protection where mark is protected as a
valuable product or part of a valuable product itself).
240. Compare Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, 120 S. Ct. at 1344-45 (noting that "application of
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(3) That the availability of a plausible claim for infringement will
often prove sufficient to deter effective competition;24' and
(4) That the need to encourage new products and alternative
designs is better addressed through the patent and copyright laws,
242
rather than expansive trade dress protection.
Although the Court continued to suggest that product packaging may
qualify as inherently distinctive,4 3 the Court re-emphasized the
consumer interest in competition by requiring courts to "err on the
side of caution and classify ambiguous trade dress as productdesign."'4
Second, at a more general level, the Court's decision represents a
sharp reversal in the trajectory of its trade dress decisions. Where the
Court in Two Pesos, Inc. and Qualitex had unanimously agreed to
expand trade dress protection and abolish some longstanding
common law limitation on trade dress protection, 45 the Wal-Mart
Court unanimously agreed to restrict trade dress protection and
retain a longstanding common law limitation. In doing so, the Court
avoided the mistake of attributing significance to congressional
an inherent-distinctiveness principle [to product design is] more harmful to [the consumer
interest in competition]"), with Lunney, supra note 1, at 385-88, 433-37 (identifying
application of inherent distinctiveness to trade dress as improperly balancing the
consumer's interest in being free from confusion with the consumer's interest in free
competition).
241. Compare Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 120 S. Ct. at 1244-45 (noting that the respondent's
proposed test would "rarely provide the basis for summary disposition of an
anticompetitive strike suit" and that "[c]ompetition is deterred, however, not merely by
successful suit but by the plausible threat of successful suit"), with Lunney, supra note 1, at
393-94 n.98, 480 n.367 (noting similar potential and asserting that "the very fact that Tour
18 had to spend thousands of dollars defending a lawsuit, where its entire investment was
at risk.., was itself conclusive evidence of the anticompetitive consequences of
[overbroad trade dress protection]"). Although the phrase "strike suit" may prove
emotionally satisfying, courts should be careful to recognize that it is not simply unjustified
lawsuits that pose a threat to competition. As the Court itself recognized, the risk to
competition and consumer welfare arises from judicial interpretations of trade dress
protection that leave room for plausible claims of infringement based simply on the
imitation of some desired aspect of a popular product. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 120 S.
Ct. at 1344-45.
242. Compare idj at 1345 (noting that a plaintiff can obtain protection for a new design
"by securing a design patent or a copyright" which reduces the need to recognize a
category of inherently distinctive product designs), with Lunney, supra note 1, at 439-62
(explaining why patent and copyright better address protection of new designs than trade
dress).
243. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 120 S. Ct. at 1345-46.
244. Id. at 1346.
245. See Two Pesos, Inc., v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992); Qualitex Co. v.
Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995).
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silence regarding a secondary meaning requirement for trade dress21
6
Rather than misread congressional silence as resolving the issue, the
Court undertook to determine on its own the rule that appropriately
balanced the competing consumer interests at stake.
Taken together, the Court's realistic appraisal of trade dress
protection's costs and its demonstrated willingness to undertake
responsibility for ensuring that trade dress protection serves the
interest of consumers represent two very encouraging steps forward.
Despite these significant steps forward, the Court also took one step
back. Specifically, the Court continued to insist that the word
"symbol" in the Trademark Act may be read to encompass "'almost
anything at all that is capable of carrying meaning."'2 47 As discussed
above, such an interpretation is simply wrong. Fortunately, the Court
did not follow this erroneous interpretation to its logical conclusion,
claiming instead to find some express basis in the Trademark Act for
differentiating the distinctiveness rules for product features from the
distinctiveness rules for product packaging and technical
trademarks."4 Of course, there is no such express basis in the Act for
the simple reason that Congress did not intend to allow registration of
trade dress in the first place and so never addressed the issue.
Despite its insistence that Congress intended the word "symbol" to
include trade dress, the Court conducted its own analysis rather than
relying on the express language of the Act to resolve the secondary
meaning issue, and thereby implicitly acknowledged that Congress
did not intend the Act to encompass trade dress. 49 As a result, the
Court's insistence on a broad interpretation of "symbol" seems
primarily an attempt to cloak the judicial activism, albeit at times
unintentional, over the last forty years that has rewritten the
Trademark Act to encompass trade dress protection"
Nevertheless, force-fitting trade dress into the word "symbol"
remains problematic, and raises the same specter regarding the future
development of trademark law that Leeds' interpretation error
246. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, 120 S. Ct. at 1342-45.
247 Id. at 1342-43 (quoting Qualitex, Inc., 514 U.S. at 162).
248. See id at 1343-45.
249. Moreover, as the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. case involved an action under section 43(a),
its ruling would not necessarily require a similarly broad interpretation of "symbol" for
purposes of the principal register. Id at 1342 ("It is the latter provision [§ 43(a)] that is at
issue in this case."). As discussed, given that the common law has long allowed protection
of trade dress under the doctrine of unfair competition, recognizing trade dress protection
under section 43(a) is far less troubling than recognizing trade dress as a principal register
trademark. See cases cited supra note 206.
250. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, 120 S. Ct. at 1343.
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initially raised. As time passes and memories fade, courts may again
forget how trade dress came to receive protection under the
Trademark Act and begin expanding trade dress protection in the
mistaken belief that Congress has resolved the desirability of doing
so. The history of trade dress protection over the last forty years
shows how large a little lie can grow. 5' In the face of that lesson, the
simple truth would have served the Court far better. Recognizing the
fact that Congress did not intend to extend protection to trade dress
would not necessarily have required the Court to abandon trade dress
protection under the Trademark Act. The time is passed when courts
operate under the assumption that they cannot make law. However,
recognizing the truth regarding trade dress would both caution and
challenge the Court. As a caution, the truth would warn the Court
that retaining a broad definition of symbol for purposes of the
principal register contradicts Congress's considered judgment on the
issue and taints the legitimacy of registered trade dress. As a
challenge, it would emphasize that trade dress protection is a judicial,
and not legislative, creation, and as a result, courts, and not the
legislature, bear the responsibility for ensuring that their creature
remains a servant of the public, and not merely a private, interest.
251. Although Leeds' mistake occurred in 1958, a federal court did not grant relief for a
trade dress claim under the Trademark Act until eighteen years later. See Truck Equip.
Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210,1214 (8th Cir. 1976).
[Vol. 51
